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     During the Korean War the White House and the Army publicized the Medal of Honor to 
achieve three outcomes. First, they hoped it would have a positive influence on public opinion. 
Truman committed to limited goals at the start of the war and chose not to create an official 
propaganda agency, which led to partisan criticism and realistic reporting. Medal of Honor 
publicity celebrated individual actions removed from their wider context in a familiar, heroic 
mold to alter memory of the past. Second, the Army publicized the Medal of Honor internally to 
inspire and reinforce desired soldier behavior. Early reports indicated a serious lack of discipline 
on the front lines and the Army hoped to build psychological resilience in the men by exposing 
them to the heroic actions of other soldiers. Finally, the Cold War spawned a great fear of 
communist subterfuge in the United States, which was exacerbated by the brainwashing of 
prisoners of war. The White House and the Army reached out to marginalized elements of 
American society through the Medal of Honor to counter communist propaganda.  
     The Korean War remains an understudied era of American history, yet it was incredibly 
important to the United States and the world. The war influenced the United States to maintain a 
large standing military prepositioned around the world to protect its interests. Achieving the 
status quo antebellum validated the containment strategy against communism, which heavily 
influenced the decision to intervene in Vietnam. The United Nations, ostensibly in charge of 
allied forces in the Korean War, gained credibility from preventing the loss of South Korea. 
Despite these important effects of the war on world history, scholars continue to focus on World 
War II and Vietnam. This study seeks to build on the relative dearth of scholarly material on the 
Korean War by examining in historical context the manipulation of a symbol that intersected 
































     Americans believed in heroes in 1950, and they desperately needed one in July of that year. 
The North Korean People‘s Army (NKPA) mauled American ground troops in July and August, 
and reports from the front lines reflected the bad news. President Harry S. Truman attempted to 
reshape public memory of those first disastrous months by announcing that Major General 
William F. Dean had won the Medal of Honor (MOH). The timing of the announcement was 
conspicuous because Dean was missing in action, but neither the White House nor the U. S. 
Army was thinking about an award presentation at that time. The announcement also capitalized 
on positive front line reports from the successful Inchon landing and restoration of the South 
Korean government in Seoul. The White House approved the MOH for General Dean to 
recognize his individual actions, but also to influence public opinion by offering an alternative, 
positive memory of July 1950. Throughout the war, the White House and the Army shaped 
MOH publicity to alter public memory, influence soldier behavior, and counter communist 
propaganda.   
     Dean commanded the 24th Infantry Division during the first weeks of the Korean War. 
Truman‘s decision to commit ground troops caught the United States Army off-guard, and forced 
General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, to deploy the 24th 
Division to South Korea in separate units. He hoped the piecemeal commitment would delay the 
NKPA assault long enough for him to build sufficient combat power to launch a counterattack. 
MacArthur charged Dean with executing the initial phases of the delay.
1
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     Part of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles 
B. Smith, spearheaded American intervention in Korea. Task Force Smith detrained at eight 
o‘clock a.m. on July 2, 1950, in Taejon.
2
 General Dean arrived by plane the next day and 
instructed Smith to establish a defensive position north of Osan. He then ordered the 34th 
Regiment to establish a support position to the southwest of Smith.
3
 Dean hoped the presence of 
his troops would bolster the confidence of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army forces, but when 
the NKPA attacked both the Americans and the ROKs disintegrated under pressure. General 
Dean exhausted himself circulating the battlefield to encourage his men as they retreated south, 
but on July 19, he personally took charge of defensive measures in Taejon. 
     Between July 19 and 20, Dean attempted to halt the general ROK and American retreat that 
started with the North Korean invasion on June 25. Underequipped, underprepared, and shocked 
by the reality of combat, the American and ROK forces stood little chance against the North 
Korean‘s T-34 tanks. To inspire his men, Dean personally organized a bazooka team and hunted 
tanks in the streets, but the NKPA overran the city nonetheless. Dean gathered his men at 
nightfall and ordered them to retreat, but his driver made a wrong turn that separated him from 
the main convoy. His vehicle hit a roadblock that forced his small group of men to hide until the 
next morning. Dean, who was looking for water for his wounded men during the night, fell down 
a mountainside, knocking him unconscious. When he awoke, Dean discovered that he was alone 
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     The award of the MOH to General Dean caused some controversy. At least two officers in 
Dean‘s command criticized him for forgetting his proper place on the battlefield.
 5
 It was then, as 
it is now, unusual for a division commander to be that close to the front lines. Dean‘s proper role 
was to exercise command and control of his subordinate commands, the 21st and 34th 
Regiments, but instead he personally engaged the enemy in the streets of Taejon. Dean later 
claimed his actions were meant to inspire his troops, an understandable gesture considering the 
unabated retreats of the previous two weeks.
6
 Dean‘s troops had been hastily committed to 
combat against a better enemy, suffered early defeats, and lost their confidence. He understood 
that his men looked to him for guidance and example, and he hoped they would respond to his 
bold actions.  
     By all accounts, the battle of Taejon was a complete disaster. The NKPA destroyed American 
lines of communication resulting in confusion and disorderly retreat. They inflicted heavy 
casualties and captured the American division commander. Worse still, the NKPA advance was 
delayed by only seven hours. Nevertheless, newspaper articles announcing the award of the 
MOH to Dean just two and a half months later described a brave hero leading a small force 
against overwhelming odds. The stories teleologically connected Dean‘s individual actions to the 
eventual American success at Inchon. Newspapers dutifully reprinted excerpts of the official 
MOH citation that emphasized heroism, valor, and self-sacrifice to appeal to widely held 
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American ideals and self-conceptions. In Dean‘s case, the White House and the Army used the 
MOH to offset negative perceptions of the war with an alternative, positive memory of Taejon.  
     The handling of Dean‘s case was similar to that of General Jonathan M. Wainwright. The 
White House awarded the MOH to Wainwright after a heroic last-stand effort against the 
Japanese during World War II, but there were important contextual differences between the two 
cases. The U. S. commitment to total war in World War II affected nearly every American and, 
therefore, garnered general public support. The U. S. government sustained that support, in part, 
through the employment of official propaganda agencies that worked with the press to create 
images of the G. I. as a confident and easy-going hero. During the Korean War, however, 
partisan bickering started as soon as General Dean‘s troops were committed to the fighting. A 
majority of Americans supported the broader Cold War against the Soviet Union, but were 
conflicted over the limited commitment to the Korean War. The lack of an official propaganda 
agency allowed criticism of the war to circulate, and the press to create a more realistic image of 
the G. I. as a tragic hero and victim of circumstance.
7
 Part of the appeal of MOH publicity was 
that it allowed the White House and the Army to present the Korean War in the familiar, heroic 
mold of World War II. 
     The White House and the Army used the MOH in three ways during the Korean War. By 
1950, the MOH was an accepted symbol of broad American values including courage, 
individualism, and self-sacrifice.  Its publicity, therefore, offered a positive counterbalance to 
negative public perceptions of the war. The White House and the Army attempted to alter public 
memory of the past and thereby subtly influence opinion by appealing to the symbolism of the 
MOH. Second, the Army internally publicized the MOH to inspire and reinforce desired 
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behavior in its soldiers. Senior officials believed this was particularly important because the 
Army fielded a young, undertrained force in a war that did not garner national support. Third, as 
Red fears mounted in the U. S., the White House used MOH publicity as counterpropaganda 
against communism. The White House reinforced American ideals and, reciprocally, defined the 
communist enemy through the presentation and publicizing of the MOH. 
     The use of the MOH in this way has not received scholarly attention for several reasons, the 
most important of which being the sanctity it first earned in World War II. This has created a 
psychological aversion to deconstructing the award, potentially cheapening the experiences of 
those who have earned it. The MOH is also part of a rewards system so basic to human nature 
that it is easy to ignore. Analysis of this aspect of behavior has been limited to the psychology 
and sociology fields, but has yet to be examined in historical context. Finally, there is a relative 
dearth of scholarly work on the Korean War.  
     This thesis examines how the MOH was used to alter memory and influence public opinion, 
reinforce desired behavior in soldiers, and inoculate Americans against communist propaganda 
within the historical context of the Korean War. This study does not intend to cheapen the 
experiences of living recipients nor dishonor those who received the award posthumously. This 
study provides insights into how the Medal of Honor intersected with both the military and home 
fronts, how its symbolism influenced people in historical context, and how symbols and 







    The amount of literature devoted to the Korean War is limited relative to World War II and 
Vietnam. The majority of the writing that does exist is political-military history; the most useful 
are South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu by Roy A. Appleman, Korea: The First War We Lost 
by Bevin Alexander, and The Forgotten War by Clay Blair. Most historians of the Korean War 
start with Appleman‘s South to the Naktong for two reasons: it was the first work published in 
the Army‘s official Korean War history series, and Appleman is a thorough researcher and able 
writer. His work describes the first six months of the war in great tactical detail, and is 
particularly useful for understanding, from a military perspective, just how bad the situation was 
in the early weeks. Appleman convincingly argues that poor preparation caused poor 
performance on the battlefield. He finds fault with senior officers on the battlefield, but balances 
his criticism by acknowledging heroism as well. The main limitation of South to the Naktong is 
its scope, but it remains an essential source for study of the Korean War.  
     Published in 1986, Korea: The First War We Lost reflects the general disillusionment with 
war and the U. S. government characteristic of post-Vietnam era writing. Despite this dated 
view, the book contributes thoughtful analysis of the Chinese perspective of U. S. actions during 
the war. Alexander argues that the American high command ignored clear warnings from the 
Chinese that they would intervene if the U. S. crossed north of the 38th parallel. The study 
synthesizes the major military and political events of 1950-53, and ably demonstrates how they 
interacted with one another. For example, Alexander argues that the experience of Chinese 





enthusiasm of military officers for offensive operations even as U. S. forces experienced success 
on the battlefield in mid-1950.  
     Blair‘s Forgotten War is perhaps the most influential book yet written on Korea. Besides 
giving the war its popular moniker, the work presents a thorough analysis of all the military-
political aspects of the war including the military and political situation in Korea from 1946 to 
1949. He faults the economic policies of the Truman administration during the interwar years for 
crippling the U. S. military. The administration‘s real crime, according to Blair, was selling a 
rhetorical Cold War against communism to the American public without making any real 
preparations for hot war contingencies. The study blends the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of the war within their political context. The result is a thoroughly readable, and very 
complete, rendering of U. S. involvement in the Korean War. Though Forgotten War is 
hampered by moral judgments that reflect Blair‘s disdain for the Vietnam War, the book remains 
the most complete military history of the war. 
    The Army‘s official Korean War history series originally included Truce Tent and Fighting 
Front by Walter G. Hermes, Policy and Direction by James F. Schnabel, and Ebb and Flow by 
Billy C. Mossman, all published between 1965 and 1988. Truce Tent examines the problem of 
fighting a limited war so soon after the total war commitment of World War II. Hermes argues 
that it was difficult to sell stalemate and compromise in Korea when Americans had become 
accustomed to total victory. He argues that the dismissal of MacArthur and the resulting 
Congressional hearings sparked policy debates that turned public opinion against the war. More 
recent scholarship, however, has challenged these assertions. Debate over conduct of the war 





Truman administration for being soft on communism before and during the war, and the 
Congressional hearings resulted in increased public support for Truman‘s limited war policy.   
     Hermes characterizes the final two years of the war as a stalemate with smaller offensive 
actions designed to gain diplomatic leverage. Prisoner of war exchange gained importance 
during armistice negotiations, and his discussion of POWs is particularly strong as it illuminates 
an issue that captured Cold War hysteria during, and after, the war. In the chapter, ―The 
Problems of Limited War,‖ Hermes contributes a useful examination of the political effect on 
budgeting and manpower in the military. His strongest conclusion is that the U. S. fear of 
appearing as an aggressor necessitated a limited war policy. Truce Tent will appeal mostly to 
political and diplomatic historians but contains useful analysis for anyone studying the Korean 
War. 
     James Schnabel builds on Appleman‘s work in Policy and Direction, the third book in the 
series. This works details the major political events between the invasion of South Korea and 
General Matthew Ridgway‘s assumption of command of the U. S. Army‘s Far East Command. 
Schnabel argues that the Korean War is best understood within the context of Cold War politics 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Their mutual distrust led both sides to establish 
proxy regimes in their respective parts of Korea. Although both removed occupation troops from 
Korea in 1949, the U. S. left an advisory group behind to train the ROK Army. Schabel argues 
that even though the advisory group provided intelligence adequate to predict the North Korean 
invasion, it did not matter because U. S. policy left Korea outside of its zone of protection in the 
Pacific region. As a result, North Korea had little reason to believe the U. S. would intervene in 





     The strength of Schnabel‘s work is that his narrative never bogs down in operational or 
tactical details and clearly depicts how battlefield events shaped policy. The work would be 
strengthened, however, by a section exploring the interaction of policy and public opinion and 
the implications of that relationship for a democracy at war. Instead, the book focuses on the 
relationship between the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Far East Command. 
Fleshing out the influence of World War II on policy debates and its influence on the Korean 
War would widen the study‘s appeal, but this omission is due more to the time of its writing than 
any weakness of the author. 
     The fourth work in the series is Ebb and Flow by Billy C. Mossman. His narrative follows 
South to Pusan, and is set between November 1950 and July 1951. Mossman describes the 
progress and retreat of U. S. forces at great length and, naturally, focuses heavily on the U. S. 
reaction to Chinese intervention. He argues that continued manpower and equipment problems, 
the long retreat back to South Korea, and the skill of the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) 
caused morale to sag in the U. S. Army. The Eighth Army‘s effectiveness on the battlefield did 
not improve until the spring of 1951 when General Matthew Ridgway took command following 
the accidental death of General Walton Walker. 
      Ridgway consolidated his forces south of Seoul and launched a series of limited 
counterattacks that gradually pushed the CCF back north of the 38th parallel, but memory of the 
previous winter tempered enthusiasm in the White House. The growing dispute between 
MacArthur and Truman over war policy further complicated matters. Mossman argues that 
MacArthur and his Congressional supporters wanted to attack CCF supply bases on the Chinese 
mainland, while Truman and his advisors, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continued to 





leave Europe unprotected. MacArthur finally stepped beyond his bounds, and Truman relieved 
him of command. Truman promoted Ridgway to command the U. S. Army‘s Far East Command, 
which provided him with an ally on the battlefront. 
     The strength of Ebb and Flow lies in its inclusion of detailed information about the CCF, 
despite the difficulty in obtaining source documents. The study is a classic example of 
operational military history, and is useful to military planners and enthusiasts of the Korean War. 
The study does not engage enough in civil-military affairs to interest diplomatic or policy 
historians, however, and its failure to address any social issues associated with the war will likely 
turn general historians away. 
      A number of quality political-military histories of the Korean War have been less influential 
in the field, among them are Joseph Goulden‘s Korea: The Untold Story of the War, Richard 
Whelan‘s Drawing the Line, The Korean War by Max Hastings, The Korean War: The West 
Confronts Communism by Michael Hickey, and David Halberstam‘s The Coldest Winter: 
America and the Korean War. All of these works follow a general narrative pattern that begins 
with a short history of the partitioning of Korea, followed by the relationship between the White 
House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Far East Command, and the Korean Military Advisory 
Group. These studies typically organize their narratives around four general phases of the war: 
the retreat to Pusan; the United Nations counter-offensive; the Chinese intervention; and the 
stalemate.   
     These studies diverge from each other in their points of emphasis. Hickey focuses on the 
United Nations and alliance building, particularly the British Commonwealth, while Hastings 
adds useful chapters on intelligence, the air war, and POWs. Goulden explains Chinese 





the Cold War. A common weakness in this group of studies is the exclusion of broader social 
issues. Their synthesis of the political and military aspects of the war and avoidance of minute 
tactical details is their biggest strength. All of these books will appeal to general readers and 
provide useful secondary sources for historians of the Korean War.  
     The most useful of Korean War oral histories and personal memoirs are Donald Knox‘s The 
Korean War: Pusan to Chosin and The Korean War: Uncertain Victory. Both volumes organize 
their recollections chronologically, and include operational summaries for context. Discrepancies 
between individual memories and official histories are inherent in oral histories, and these 
volumes are no different. Nevertheless, they remain excellent sources for immersion into the 
confusion and emotion of the actual fighting. The Coldest War, by James Brady, is a useful 
memoir of the Marine Corps experience in Korea that emphasizes the effects of harsh weather 
and terrain on operations and morale. The inter-service rivalry between the Marine Corps and the 
Army, as well as their differing institutional mindsets, is on display in this memoir. Lewis H. 
Carlson‘s study, Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War, is an informative oral history that 
focuses on the horrendous conditions faced by American POWs. Psychologists argued that a 
majority POWs collaborated with the communists because of an innate weakness, and as a result, 
these men were looked down upon as failures and potential communist spies at home. 
     Korean War literature has grown to include social issues like race, the home-front, and gender 
in recent years, but the field still needs more attention. Historians Allen R. Millet and Kieh-
chiang Oh have argued that the ROK Army performed better than previously accepted, and that 
the original criticism stemmed from racial bias among American officers. Along the same lines, 
William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle re-examine the 





all-black 24th Regiment created by the racial attitudes of white officers was mostly responsible 
for the Regiment‘s poor performance. Charles M. Bussey and Lyle Rishell have also argued the 
same point in separate works. Gender studies have received some attention, but focus mainly on 
the experience of nurses in the mobile army surgical hospitals.  
     Steven Casey‘s work, Selling the Korean War, is an outstanding examination of the 
interaction between war, propaganda, politics, and public opinion on the home front. Casey 
organizes his work chronologically with thematic subdivisions that focus on U. S. government 
efforts to sustain public support for the war. He argues that Truman relied on informal 
communication channels including speeches, official communiqués, and State and Defense 
Department Public Relations Bureaus, rather than establishing a formal propaganda agency. 
Casey challenges the idea that during the Korean War information was ―an unregulated 
marketplace of ideas,‖ arguing that the Truman administration purposefully used informal 
channels to influence opinion.
8
 Casey is quick to point out, though, that the purposeful use of 
information does not necessarily imply any sinister motives. 
     Another original work that is sure to influence future studies of the Korean War is Andrew J. 
Huebner‘s The Warrior Image. This study compares images of the American G. I. in World War 
II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Huebner argues that official propaganda agencies and 
a willing press created an image of the World War II G. I. as an easy-going team player with a 
can-do attitude. By the end of the war, images had begun to portray more realism, but the war 
ended before this became a predominant trend. The press gained an opportunity to portray war 
realistically when Truman decided against creating a propaganda agency during the Korean War. 
The G. I. subsequently became a fatigued, stoic, and sorrowful victim of circumstance. The 
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transformation of wartime imagery was gradual and continuities remained with World War II. 
Huebner asserts that the Korean War was a transition point between World War II, where the 
press was a tool of the government, and the Vietnam War, where open hostility existed between 
the press and the government. 
     The last major genre of Korean War literature focuses strictly on military operations in order 
to provide ―lessons-learned.‖ These works targets military planners as their audience and include 
works on the air war, naval operations, and special operations. The Marine Corps has received 
attention in this genre in works on the Inchon landing and the Chosin Reservoir. S. L. A. 
Marshall‘s Pork Chop Hill examines this prolonged battle at the tactical level, and the work 
provides a good study for use in an officer professional development program. Donald W. Boose 
Jr.‘s Over the Beach: U. S. Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War traces the Army‘s 
history of amphibious warfare, and provides a series of concise operational studies focused on 
planning. Recent article-length works in this subfield are ―The Ordeal of the Tiger Survivors,‖ by 
William C. Latham, Jr., and the series of articles focused on special operations published by the 
Office of the Command Historian for the Special Operations Command in Veritas.    
     If the historiography of the Korean War is sparse, then that of the Medal of Honor is virtually 
non-existent. The few books written about the MOH are typically set in the heroic mold with 
most of their attention focused on the official award citations. Examples of this type of study are 
Edward F. Murphy‘s Korean War Heroes, Kenneth N. Jordan, Sr.‘s Forgotten Heroes, Allen 
Mikaelian‘s Medal of Honor, and Peter Collier‘s Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor Beyond the 
Call of Duty. Murphy organizes the awards chronologically within a broader narrative of the 
Korean War, while Jordan similarly organizes the citations while providing official 





in a longer timeframe with the citations in narrative form rather than strictly reproducing the 
official versions. Both use selected cases from each of America‘s major wars to define American 
heroism as distinctive and timeless, even as each war differed in various ways. The only book-
length social history of the MOH is The Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the Medal of Honor in 
World War II, by Elliott V. Converse III, Daniel K. Gibran, John A. Cash, Robert K. Griffith, Jr., 
and Richard H. Kohn. This study examines the policies that dictated the nomination of, and 
approval for, the MOH, and argues that those policies allowed racial bias among officers to 
prevent black soldiers from earning the nation‘s highest decoration for bravery during World 
War II. 
     Much scholarly work remains undone on the Korean War. Political histories could further 
explore the long-term effects of the war on the relationship between the U. S. and both Koreas. 
The Korean War, more than World War II, directly influenced the creation of a U. S. military 
posture that endures today, and yet discussion of this fact remains limited to a few paragraphs of 
introductory material in most studies. The Korean War forced racial integration in the Army, but 
there is a lack of study on the effects of that change in both the Army and in broader society. The 
economic effects of the war and the experiences of families and veterans would also be valuable 
studies. New studies would help emphasize the war‘s importance to the Cold War and reverse its 
reputation as an aberration in American warfare. 
      
 
      
       





     Chapter 1 
The Interwar Years: Korea, the Cold War, and the U. S. Army 
 
     The Korean peninsula became two distinct nations divided at the 38th parallel purely by 
historical chance. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt first discussed what to do with Korea 
after its liberation from Japan with Joseph Stalin at Yalta in 1945. The two men, unsurprisingly, 
had different opinions about what to do with Korea. Although both men agreed that a period of 
trusteeship was required since Korea had been under Japanese occupation for so long, they 
disagreed over the length of time it would take to turn control of the country over to the Koreans. 
Roosevelt envisioned a decades-long process of training and educating eventually resulting in a 
turnover of authority to civilian control, while Stalin favored a short period of occupation 
followed by elections. American planners recommended the 38th parallel as a dividing line 
because it divided the peninsula roughly in half. The Americans proposed that the Soviets accept 
Japanese surrender north of the line and the U. S., south. Stalin approved the plan, but American 
planners were nervous since their troops were too scattered to enforce the agreement militarily. 
As it turned out, Stalin stopped his forces at the 38th parallel because he already possessed 
everything he wanted from the Korean peninsula: industrial raw materials and warm-water ports. 
American troops occupied the south and both powers began a period of trusteeship in their 




The Irony of Trusteeship 
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     The greatest irony of the trusteeship period is that Koreans in the Soviet-controlled north 
actually enjoyed greater autonomy than their counterparts in the U. S.-controlled south. A 
political party consisting of members from the left and the right established an interim 
government, the Korean People‘s Republic (KPR), in both the north and the south following the 
Japanese surrender. Although the party included members from across the political spectrum, all 
agreed that Korea should be unified and independent. The KPR built its support by establishing 
local governments across the peninsula to provide police and essential services.
10
 
     The Soviets were much better than their American counterparts at co-opting local support, 
and they used the KPR to provide stability in the north. Michael Hickey points out that ―the 
Russian 25th Army in the north had brought its own highly trained political staff,‖ and they ―also 
possessed a high-powered public relations and propaganda machine.‖
11
 The Soviets empowered 
Korean political activists, even nationalists, at local levels to put a Korean face on government. 
Only those who embraced communism, however, could hold any real power at higher levels. 
     In contrast, the U. S. occupation was fairly inept. American officials initially conceived of the 
trusteeship of Korea as a four-power operation similar to the occupation of Germany. As late as 
September 1945, the British government had no idea that this was the U. S. plan. U. S. 
occupation forces under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge had an inauspicious 
start. One of Hodge‘s primary failings, shared with many American troops, was his failure to 
understand basic cultural differences among Asians. His statement that Koreans were ―the same 
breed of cats as the Japs,‖ undoubtedly encouraged racial chauvinism among the Americans.
12
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Hodge viewed the KPR as a communist threat because of its success in the north, and he set out 
to destroy the organization in the south.
13
 
       Major General Archibald Arnold, second in command of U. S. forces in Korea, exacerbated 
the situation with his decision to retain Japanese civil servants. This decision antagonized the 
Koreans, and showed how unprepared senior American military officials were for the delicate 
and nuanced challenges of trusteeship. Hodge received an influx of American civil servants from 
Washington, but the language barrier and their cultural ignorance only increased tensions with 
the Koreans. He then turned to the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), a group of English speaking 
archconservatives, for support. Their influence further contributed to Hodge‘s view of the KPR 
as the source of all discontent with the American Military Government (AMG).
14
 
     Frustrated with the slow pace of progress and determined to prevent Korea from becoming a 
communist satellite, Hodge embraced political repression. Syngman Rhee wanted to become 
President of the Republic of Korea, and his virulent anti-communism earned him the support of 
President Truman. The U. S. hoped that Rhee would put a Korean face on their trusteeship and 
that he would build local support for U. S. policies. Rhee, however, was a nationalist, and he 




     By mid-1947, both the Americans and the Soviets wanted to hold nationwide elections in 
Korea, but could not agree on how to do it. The U. S. believed that communist subterfuge was 
rampant in the south and that communist agents would tamper with election results. In fact, it 
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was AMG repression and its failure to attain stability that fed the popularity of left-wing political 
groups more so than any subterfuge. Above all, the AMG supported Rhee who brutally squashed 
resistance to his government. Between late 1948 and early 1949, the AMG stood by as Rhee‘s 
regime arrested 89,710 people. Worse still, Rhee‘s main political rival was assassinated in June 





KMAG and the U. S. Extrication from South Korea 
     Congressional Republicans prioritized rebuilding Europe over funding the AMG in Korea. 
Fear of Russian expansion and demobilizing the massive U. S. military force from World War II 
dominated political thinking during this time. A majority of Americans, including most military 
planners, relied on nuclear supremacy to provide relatively low-cost protection from Soviet 




     The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that although Korea had ―little strategic interest‖ for the 
United States, ―a precipitate withdrawal of our forces under such circumstances would lower the 
military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting 
cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States.‖
18
 This pronouncement 
indicated the importance of Europe to the U. S., and demonstrated the complexity of diplomatic 
maneuvering during the Cold War. The U. S. feared that showing weakness in Korea would 
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encourage the Soviets to act aggressively in Europe, and believed the best solution to this 
problem was to turn the matter over to the United Nations. U. S. diplomats submitted a draft 
resolution on October 17, 1947, calling for ―legislative elections throughout the Korean 
peninsula by March 31, 1948‖ under U. N. supervision.
19
 The U. S. and U. N. proceeded with 
elections in the south despite Russian objections, a de facto acknowledgement of the permanent 
division of the peninsula.
20
    
     The Soviets sponsored their own elections in the north three months later, and claimed that 75 
percent of voters in the south had participated.
21
 The claim was bogus, but it allowed them to say 
their government represented all Koreans. The election resulted in the formation of the 
Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea with Kim Il-Sung as its leader. By June 1949, the U. S. 
withdrew its occupation forces, leaving behind only the 500-man Korean Military Advisory 
Group (KMAG). The Soviets followed suit, leaving behind what historian Richard Whelan 
describes as ―two hostile states – not really by American design, but by confusion, drift, 
misunderstanding, resentment, expedience, incompetence, good intentions, intransigence, failed 
bluffs, dashed hopes, and fear.‖
22
 
     Brigadier General W. Lynn Roberts, commander of the KMAG, officially assumed 
responsibility for military matters in Korea on July 1, 1949.
23
 The KMAG, like the wider Army, 
faced serious problems. The ROK Army had spent most of Washington‘s initial financial 
investment hunting opposition groups across South Korea. American planners had assumed 
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Rhee‘s government would take over defense costs as the Korean economy revived, but this 
proved impossible as the economy stalled. A few factories produced uniforms and small amounts 
of ammunition and equipment, but not nearly enough to fully outfit the ROK Army. The KMAG 
and the ROK Army were at the very end of the priority list for American budget planners, and a 
requested influx of American ammunition and equipment never materialized.
24
 
     The officers of the KMAG instituted a typical American training plan for the ROK soldiers. 
When soldiers reached the desired level of proficiency at rifle marksmanship, first aid training, 
and map reading, among other skills, they moved on to team and squad tactics. Three major 
problems, besides the severe shortage of ammunition and equipment, prevented this plan from 
working. First, ROK enlisted soldiers were mostly illiterate and had no existing military jargon 
in their own language. This required KMAG and ROK soldiers to create their own terms for 
familiar items, a process that slowed the pace of training. Second, Korean culture prevented 
leaders from publicly admitting mistakes. This forced KMAG trainers to find new ways of 
developing leaders and increased the difficulties involved in training squads and platoons. 
Finally, the presence of the hostile NKPA across the 38th parallel forced the ROK Army to 
maintain four divisions on its border. The ROK government could not afford to bring them off 
the line for retraining.
25
 
     KMAG officers pressed on, but the ROK Army remained woefully unprepared to defend its 
country from outside invasion. By early 1950, rifle qualification rates remained dismal, and only 
a few battalions were functioning proficiently. The four divisions on the 38th parallel were no 
better off. Lenient pass policies, lax discipline, and frequent rotations prevented any meaningful 
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improvement within the ROK Army. Despite these problems, U. S. officials reported to 
Washington that the ROK Army was performing at a high level of proficiency.
26
 
     In early 1950, there were clear signs that the KMAG‘s days were numbered. The man 
scheduled to replace Roberts retired rather than go to Korea, and a spending bill intended to fund 
the KMAG was on hold in Congress. Truman announced that the U. S. would no longer support 
the Chinese Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa, while Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
outlined a Pacific strategic defense plan that left Korea left out altogether.
27
 Senator Tom 
Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and friend of the Truman 
administration, told a reporter that Korea was not ―very greatly important‖ strategically to the   
U. S.
28
 To observers both inside and outside of Korea, it appeared that the U. S. was indeed 
extricating itself from the peninsula. 
     Many analysts have condemned the KMAG as a complete failure, but it did enjoy some small 
but meaningful successes. The creation of specialty schools for logisticians, artillerymen, 
engineers, and other technical fields paid dividends for the ROK Army, and the Korean General 
Staff also started an officer school modeled on West Point that produced quality junior officers. 
The KMAG officers undoubtedly felt pressured to overemphasize these small successes so that 
Washington could politically justify extricating the U. S. from Korea. Roberts could not have 
been so blind as to believe that the small successes of the ROK Army could overcome its major 
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problems, but he testified before Congress that the ROK Army was capable of defeating an 
invasion from the north.
29
 
      
The Effects of United States Foreign Policy on the Army 
     Following World War II, a majority of Americans wanted to ―bring the boys home.‖ Clay 
Blair argues that this popular notion combined with ―Truman‘s trench-level military outlook‖ 
and ―his fiscal conservatism and contempt for generals and admirals,‖ to weaken the U. S. 
military on many fronts.
30
 In addition to drastic cuts in the Army, the Navy suffered a reduction 
of nearly 3 million men and 29 aircraft carriers. The Marine Corps nearly ceased to exist, while 
the Air Force maintained only 38 fighter groups, 11 of which were capable of conducting 
missions. The Truman administration reduced expenditures as it amplified the communist threat, 
but failed to prepare for conventional hot war contingencies.
31
 
     The U. S. viewed communism as a monolithic threat controlled by Moscow. In 1948, the 
communist blockade of Berlin and seizure of Czechoslovakia validated American fears of Soviet 
expansion. The 1949 communist take-over of China by Mao Zedong offered more evidence of a 
communist assault against the free world. The seminal event of that year, however, was the 
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     The Soviet possession of the nuclear bomb shocked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the White 
House did not echo this concern. Clay Blair argues that ―it was a moment in history for Harry 
Truman to stand tall: to proclaim a ‗different world‘ strategically, to abandon his petty 
conviction that he was still being budgetarily flimflammed by the generals and admirals, and to 
pronounce a dramatic turnabout in his national security programs.‖
33
 Instead, however, he 
continued to reduce the defense budget. Truman publicly downplayed the significance of Soviet 
nuclear power, and privately pressured Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to continue cutting 
costs. 
     The State and Defense Departments formed a joint study group, headed by Paul Nitze, to 
develop recommendations for a U. S. response to the events of 1948 and 1949. Republicans 
charged the Truman administration with being soft on communism, and Truman wanted a 
product from the group that would counter that claim. In response, Nitze‘s team produced a 
policy paper known as National Security Council No. 68 (NSC-68). The document defined 
Soviet intentions as ―the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of 
government and structure of society in the non-Soviet world, and their replacement by an 
apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled by the Kremlin.‖
34
 U. S. policy planners 
decided to remain on the strategic defensive, but acknowledged a massive defense buildup was 
required to contain Soviet expansion. 
     NSC-68 argued for a large standing military trained and equipped to respond to communist 
aggression, but Acheson knew the cost of building this force would be difficult to sell. The 
proposal outraged Johnson, who stormed out of a joint briefing between the State and Defense 
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Departments. Truman, unaware of the total cost, scolded Johnson who promptly signed the 
proposal without any further distraction. Truman signed NSC-68 on April 25, 1950, but its 
implementation was delayed because of its cost.
35
 
     Johnson submitted a proposed 1951 Defense budget of $12.3 billion to Congress, a $1.7 
billion reduction from the previous year. The Joint Chiefs, fearing conflict with Truman and 
Johnson, supported the budget even though they knew it was far too small to implement the 
provisions of NSC-68. The Army cut another 47,000 troops, but Chief of Staff Joe Collins 
argued that the Army could better equip the fewer men.
36
 Nothing was further from the truth in 
the U. S. Eighth Army, which was, at the time, performing occupation duties in Japan. In 1950, 
the Eighth Army consisted of four divisions: the 25th, 24th, 7th, and 1st Cavalry. Each division 
had wartime allocations of 18,800 men, but the 24th, 7th, and 1st Cavalry operated under budget-
adjusted allocations of 12,500 men. The 25th Division had an allocation of 13,500 because it 
contained the overstaffed all-black 24th Regiment. Each division actually operated with fewer 
men than it had been allotted. Clay Blair estimates that ―none of the four divisions was capable 
of laying down more than 62 percent of its normal infantry firepower.‖
37
 This setup may have 
worked for occupation duty, but it was woefully inadequate to fight a war. 
     In the five years between World War II and the Korean War, the Korean people transitioned 
from Japanese subjects to pawns in the proxy war between the Soviet Union and the U. S. 
Koreans were, ironically, more free in the communist north than in the democratic south because 
vehemently anti-communist President Rhee brutally repressed opposition to his regime. Faced 
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with political pressure to end their mission in Korea, senior American officers inflated the 
capabilities of the ROK Army in their reports. Worse still, these officers happily deluded 
themselves about their own ability to protect U. S. interests around the world. The events of June 























Shock and Awe 
     The Cold War suddenly turned hot in the early morning hours of June 25, 1950, making the 
assessment of Soviet intentions contained in NSC-68 appear valid. State Department officials 
used the invasion to sell a military buildup to the American public. Truman believed, along with 
most Americans, that the Soviet Union was behind the invasion; its true purpose to distract the 
United States in Asia while expanding communism in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
Initially, Truman enjoyed broad support for his decision to intervene, but that support quickly 
eroded as the inherent difficulties of waging a limited war became apparent. From the start, 
Truman found it difficult to sell limited objectives in Korea to Congress and the public. A 
majority of Americans supported the stand against communist aggression, but they were far from 
certain if Korea was the right place to do so. Cold War fears amplified this conflict, creating an 
atmosphere that contrasted starkly with recent memories of national unity during World War II. 
America sent its ill-trained, ill-equipped, and undermanned Army into the fray, and the results 
enflamed an already tense situation in Washington.  
 
The Decision to Intervene and Task Force Smith 
     American policy planners viewed the North Korean invasion of South Korea as both proof of 
Soviet war mongering and as an opportunity to justify the cost of NSC-68. Fearing public 
overreaction, Truman downplayed the severity of the situation. During a press conference, he 
agreed with a reporter‘s suggestion that the U. S. had committed itself to a U. N. ―police action,‖ 
a statement that haunted him for the duration of the war.
38
 It was a fine line however, because the 
                                                             





threat had to be serious enough to maintain public support. Truman announced U.S. intervention 
on June 27, and linked the communist invasion to a potential Chinese threat to Formosa. He 
intended this connection to reinforce the idea that all communists acted in unison, and the move 




     Five days after the invasion began, the President authorized the U. S. Air Force ―to conduct 
missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary,‖ the Navy 
to blockade the Korean coast, and General MacArthur ―to use certain supporting ground units‖ to 
meet the United Nation‘s request for aid.
40
 Truman committed U. S. troops to the fighting, but 
endorsed limited objectives, and believed he ―must avoid a general Asiatic war.‖
41
 To build 
bipartisan support for intervention, the President emphasized the potential loss of credibility by 
the U. S. if it abandoned South Korea to its fate. It was only a matter of days, however, before 
political fissures opened, and bad news from the battlefield further complicated matters.
42
 
     Lieutenant Colonel Charles ―Brad‖ Smith, commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, 
received a phone call from his regimental commander, Colonel Richard Stephens, on the evening 
of June 30. Stephens told Smith, ―The lid has blown off – get on your clothes and report to the 
CP [command post].‖
43
 Stephens informed Smith that his men would be the first American 
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troops to fight in Korea. His force was small, consisting of two under-strength companies, ten 75 
mm recoilless rifles, and eight mortar tubes. Of his 440 men, only about 75 had combat 
experience from World War II, but the confident young soldiers believed the North Koreans 
would turn and run when they saw Americans on the battlefield.
44
   
     Smith‘s battalion was part of General William F. Dean‘s 24th Division. Dean arrived in 
Taejon as Smith moved his men north toward Osan and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 34th 
Regiment arrived in Pusan. Dean planned to position Task Force Smith between Osan and 
Pyongtaek to block the North Korean southward thrust along the main Seoul-to-Pusan corridor. 
He ordered the two battalions of the 34th Regiment to establish defensive positions near 
Pyongtaek. Additional forces would reinforce the defensive line as they arrived in country.
45
 
     Task Force Smith arrived at its position at 3 o‘clock a.m. on July 5. Lieutenant Philip Day 
remembered a cold drizzle that quickly turned hillside positions into mud, remarking that 
―everyone was tired, wet, cold, and a little bit pissed off.‖
46
 Smith positioned his infantry on 
several hilltops straddling the main road connecting Suwon and Osan. His recoilless rifles 
supported the infantry from the east and west, while mortars provided indirect fire support from 
the south. Smith placed his artillery support, from the 52d Field Artillery, about a mile to the 
southwest of his forward positions.
47
 
     The first column of eight North Korean T-34 tanks rumbled into view at daybreak. Day‘s 
platoon scrambled into position and fired their 75mm recoilless rifles, but direct hits glanced off 
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the armored beasts. Mortar shells and small arms fire, like the bazooka rounds, also proved 
ineffective.
48
 This small group of Americans squared off against thirty-three tanks and an entire 
infantry division.
49
 The tanks rumbled through the American forward defense virtually 
untouched, then proceeded toward the artillery positions. The artillery commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Miller O. Perry, repositioned his gun tubes to fire directly at the tanks. The 105mm 
howitzer rounds failed to destroy the tanks, but they immobilized several of them. The first 
American killed in the Korean War died from a gunshot wound suffered during an engagement 
with a NKPA tank crew escaping from a damaged T-34.
50
 This was a major engagement from 
the American perspective, but the NKPA viewed it as a minor speed bump, hardly a reason to 
halt their advance. While the young American soldiers stood dumbfounded, the tanks rolled 
south towards Osan. 
     Armored formations work best as the spearhead of an attack. Their speed and protection 
produce a shock effect on opposing ground troops and open infiltration lanes for infantry to 
exploit. Colonel Smith understood that his men had only faced the beginning of a much larger 
attack. He ordered his men to dig in deeper before the infantry assault came. Approximately an 
hour after the last tank passed through his lines, Smith observed three more tanks, numerous 
trucks, and NKPA infantry troops. Smith engaged five thousand enemy troops with a force one-
tenth of that size.
51
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     From nearly one thousand yards away, Task Force Smith unleashed what hell it could. Smith 
initially achieved surprise because the first waves of T-34s failed to alert the ground forces 
behind them to the American presence. The NKPA recovered quickly, however, and moved to 
surround Smith‘s men. Smith ordered a sequential retreat to maintain covering fire for each 
platoon as they moved, but untrained in this maneuver, his men panicked and fled.
52
 Day recalled 
that ―Guys fell around me. Mortar rounds hit here and there. One of my young guys got it in the 
middle. My platoon sergeant, Harvey Vann, ran over to him … ‗No way he‘s gonna live, 
Lieutenant.‘ Oh, Jesus, the guy was moaning and groaning. There wasn‘t much I could do. . . .‖
53
 
Smith organized his remaining men, and they fought out of the encirclement leaving dying men 




     The 34th Regiment dug positions south of Smith, near Pyongtaek, while Task Force Smith 
engaged the first group of tanks. The 1st Battalion situated itself about two miles north of 
Pyongtaek, along the same north-south road as Task Force Smith, while the 3rd Battalion went to 




       
The Trial of the 34th Regimen 
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     The piecemeal commitment of U. S. forces left the chain of command in a confused state. 
Normally, Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Ayres, commander of 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, 
received orders from his regimental commander, Colonel Jay B. Lovless. General George B. 
Barth, temporarily commanding the 24th Division Artillery, was on the ground with Ayres 
though, and Barth ordered Ayres to hold his position as long as possible but ―not to end up like 
Brad Smith.‖
56
 That night Ayres relayed the orders Barth had given him to Lovless who, in turn, 
revised his regimental plan. His revised plan did not require 3rd Battalion, and he ordered them 
to move south to Chonan.  
     At daybreak on July 6, the NKPA opened fire on Ayres‘ men. The 1st Battalion barely 
returned fire, and according to historian Bevin Alexander, ―later examination of thirty-one 
weapons in one platoon showed that twelve of the rifles were broken or dirty or had been 
assembled incorrectly, an astonishing commentary on the state of training of the individual 
riflemen.‖
57
 Within an hour, Ayers, mindful of Barth‘s instructions, ordered a retreat to Chonan 
that quickly turned into a debacle. His men threw away vital equipment as they fled, including 
helmets, rifles, and ammunition. Even more striking, soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, who had 
not been under fire, did the same thing on their movement to Chonan.
58
 
     When Ayres reached Chonan, he found an angry Barth who accused him of failing to delay 
the NKPA as ordered. General Dean was furious. He drove to the 34th Regiment‘s command 
post where he held a terse meeting with Barth, Lovless, Ayres, and the 3rd Battalion commander, 
David Smith. Dean demanded to know who ordered the retreat because it threw off his overall 
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scheme. In a classic example of general officer amnesia, Barth remained silent. Ayres realized 
that Barth was covering for himself, and took responsibility for ordering his battalion to 
withdraw. Dean read the truth of the situation and ordered Barth to return to Taejon. He relieved 
Colonel Lovless of command and replaced him with Colonel Robert R. Martin, then ordered 
Martin to attack north the next morning. Dean hoped to get his original plan back on track under 
the leadership of a commander he trusted.
59
  
     The 3rd Battalion established a defensive position again, but things continued to go badly for 
them. Major John J. Dunn, the regimental operations officer, went to the battalion‘s forward lines 
to relieve David Smith of command. He found the battalion withdrawing without having made 
contact with the NKPA. No one could find Smith or his second in command, so Dunn 
immediately assumed command of the battalion and again moved them north. Dunn‘s lead party 
consisted of the 3rd Battalion‘s operations officer, Major Boone Seegars, two company 
commanders, a security element, and himself. Their two jeeps drove into an ambush that 
wounded both majors. The battalion‘s lead rifle company moved to within assault distance, but 
rather than attack they hunkered down in covered positions. A few moments later someone 
ordered a retreat, and no one even attempted to rescue the wounded men. Major Dunn was a 
prisoner of war for the next 38 months, while Seegars died of his wounds.
60
 
     Colonel Martin rushed north to stop the ensuing retreat of the 3rd Battalion. He believed the 
disarray resulted from lack of training, unit cohesion, and strong leadership, and Martin decided 
the best way to steady his men was to lead by example. He ordered the battalion to dig in around 
Chonan on the night of July 7. The next morning several NKPA T-34s came into view ahead of 
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its infantry, and, determined to inspire his men, Martin fired a bazooka at one of them. The tank 
responded with an 85mm main-gun round that cut his body in half. Two-thirds of the battalion 




General Dean’s Last Stand 
     While the 21st and 34th Regiments were breaking apart Dean‘s 19
th
 Regiment, the ―Rock of 
Chickamauga,‖ assembled in Pusan and then moved north. On July 14, the 19th Regiment 
positioned itself on the western flank of the remnants of the 34th Regiment near the Kum River. 
That same day, the NKPA rendered the 34th combat ineffective, which left the 19th‘s flank 
exposed. The 19th had three companies abreast on an east-west axis in the vicinity of Taepyong-
ni, with artillery support to the south and two under-strength companies on its far eastern and 
western flanks. Dean tasked Colonel Guy S. Meloy, Jr., the regimental commander, with 
delaying the NKPA at the Kum River, but just like the shattered regiments before him, his was 
green, undertrained, and unsupported.
62
 
     The NKPA launched multiple probing attacks throughout the afternoon of July 15. These 
small reconnaissance patrols sought weak points in the American line, and at three o‘clock a.m. 
the NKPA launched a diversionary attacked on the American eastern flank. Its main battle force 
exploited a large gap on the American western flank that poised the North Koreans to capture the 
19th‘s headquarters. The Regimental staff officers counterattacked with a force that included 
cooks and desk clerks, but quickly dissolved after the officers in charge were killed. Dean 
ordered the 19th to withdraw, but the loss of communication lines prevented everyone from 
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getting the order. The Americans fought their way out in small groups and straggled into Taejon 
in the early morning hours of July 17.
63
 
     General Walton Walker, the Eighth Army commander and Dean‘s immediate superior, met 
with Dean in Taejon on July 18. Walker informed Dean that the 1st Cavalry Division was 
arriving in Korea and that it would take two days to get them into position at the front. Dean 
consolidated his damaged regiments to defend Taejon, hoping they could hold the line for two 
days. The situation was so dire that as replacements arrived, they were immediately shipped to 
Taejon.
64
 Sergeant Robert Dews remembered his experience as a replacement: 
     We were put on a Japanese fishing boat that smelled to high heaven of dead fish. When we 
     arrived in Pusan, everyone was quite sick. Still smelling of fish, we were immediately sent 
     north. The road south was clogged with refugees, walking wounded, and trucks carrying the 
     dead and severely wounded. Everything in Taejon was in turmoil. We replacements were 




This system further undermined the trust and cohesion that successful combat units require. This 
situation drove many officers, even senior ones like Colonel Robert Martin, to assume the job of 
a rifleman in order to inspire their men. During the defense of Taejon, Dean found himself in the 
same position. 
     Dean relocated his headquarters and most of the 19th Regiment from Taejon to Yongdong to 
re-equip and gather replacements. That left him with the remnants of the 21st and 34th 
Regiments, each of which fielded about a battalion-sized force, and an under-strength battalion 
of the 19th as a tactical reserve. The only good news Dean learned was that his men were finally 
equipped with new 3.5-inch rocket launchers that could penetrate T-34 armor. Dean divided his 
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infantry to block the Kapchon River passages into Taejon, guard the artillery, and defend the city 
itself. The NKPA attacked this tiny force with two full infantry divisions.
66
 
     The North Koreans began by dropping propaganda leaflets in an air raid, and followed with 
an infantry attack from the north and west. Earlier, Dean had pulled a platoon in closer to the 
city, and the NKPA exploited the resulting gap to pressure the Americans from the west, north, 
and south. The fighting subsided at nightfall, but the North Koreans quietly infiltrated their 
infantry through gaps in the American line.
67
 
     NKPA tanks punched through the thin lines of the 34th northwest of the city at three o‘clock 
a.m. The regiment cracked under pressure, which allowed NKPA infantry, riding on tanks, to set 
up sniper positions inside of Taejon. The bulk of their forces, however, remained outside the 
city. T-34 tanks roamed Taejon throughout the morning, but the Americans, led by Dean himself, 
destroyed five of them using their new bazookas. Nevertheless, the NKPA cut Dean‘s 
communication lines, which severely hampered his ability to coordinate units. Leaders of the 
34th and 19th Regiments retreated south in the confusion, leaving just one platoon as the only U. 
S. force west of Taejon.
68
 
     The North Koreans squeezed the city from three directions, and Dean ordered his remaining 
forces to withdraw. The NKPA destroyed the first two vehicles in his convoy as it attempted to 
get out of the city. The remaining vehicles continued on, but aimlessly drove around the city 
drawing sniper fire everywhere they went. General Dean‘s driver made a wrong turn that 
separated his and several other vehicles from the main convoy. Dean stopped at a wrecked 
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vehicle on the road nearly a mile south of the city to loaded wounded men into his jeep. Further 
down the road Dean recognized a second roadblock as an ambush, and ordered his men to 
covered positions. They moved to the base of a mountain at nightfall, planning to continue east 
to Yongdong on foot. During the night, Dean fell and was knocked unconscious as he looked for 
water for his wounded men. He awoke alone with a broken shoulder. Dean evaded the North 




     The battle of Taejon was a complete disaster for the U. S. Army, and on July 22 the 24th 
Division turned over responsibility for the front lines to the 1st Cavalry. In the first three weeks 
of war the 24th retreated over a hundred miles, often in panic. Soldiers had discarded their 
weapons and equipment, and left wounded men behind. Nearly 4,000 men were killed, wounded 
or captured, among them the division commander, a regimental commander, and numerous field 
grade officers. The official Army history of this phase of the war argues that heroism was 
displayed on the battlefield, but only because it was necessary to overcome numerous and 
unforgivable challenges arising from the pitiful state of readiness of the Army.
70
 
     The men on the battlefield never doubted the seriousness of their situation. Reporters 
accompanying the shocked and demoralized American troops were just as outraged by the poor 
state of the Army. General MacArthur‘s Far East Command claimed that the retreats were by 
design, but without a propaganda agency to direct the media, correspondents were able to 
realistically portray the human costs of the war. MacArthur‘s headquarters criticized the press for 
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doing so, but the reports and images from the early months of the war established a negative 



























The Media: Between Accessory & Antagonist  
     During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public 
Information (CPI), a formal government propaganda agency. The CPI used stereotypes to stir 
hatred towards German and public support for the war, but as early as the 1920s the organization 
was viewed by many Americans as having gone too far. During World War II, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWI) to build and sustain public 
support. Mindful of the CPI experience, the OWI focused on promoting ideals such as 
Roosevelt‘s Four Freedoms. As the war went on, Roosevelt clashed with the OWI because he 
thought it should focus on selling war bonds, while high profile members of the OWI like Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. insisted that its focus should remain on promoting ideals. The OWI also 
clashed with the Office of Censorship (OOC), but the organizations eventually worked out a 
solution whereby the OWI offered journalists suggestions for what they should say, while the 
OOC told journalists what they could not say. These agencies had a near monopoly on 
information management and heavily influenced the portrayal of American G. I.s. Towards the 
end of World War II, however, images and war reports became more realistic. President Truman 
did not create similar agencies during the Korean War because he viewed the CPI and OWI as 
necessities of total war.
 
Instead, the Truman administration used existing information channels to 
build public support for the war. The uncoordinated information management system resulted in 
confusion, while the absence of censorship allowed the press to move away from being a 
mouthpiece, as it had been in World War II, and towards what would eventually become open 
antagonism in Vietnam.
71
      
                                                             






Truman’s Information System      
     President Truman‘s refusal to establish a formal propaganda agency forced his administration 
to sell the war through ―informal channels.‖
72
 Truman himself was the most authoritative source 
for information. His public addresses carried the weight of policy, but Truman was ―often ill at 
ease when reading a prepared set piece speech.‖
 73
 In addition, the President remained relatively 
quiet during the early days of the war, creating an information gap that his Congressional 
enemies seized upon. 
     The Defense Department‘s Office of Public Information (OPI) and the State Department‘s 
Office of Public Affairs (OPA) were important information sources outside of the White House. 
The press bombarded the OPI with information requests at the outset of the war, but the agency 
was ineffective due to personnel shortages. The OPA was more effective at answering questions, 
but was limited to publicizing policy information and knew little about what was happening on 
the battlefield. The most influential source for war information, outside the White House, was 
General MacArthur‘s headquarters in Tokyo. MacArthur refused formal censorship, a decision 
that caused consternation among reporters and senior defense officials alike. Army public 
information officers suffered from a lack of guidelines, leading to overly generic briefings, and 
reporters complained that the briefings did not provide them with enough useful information. 
Reporters soon complained about the sharp contrast between MacArthur‘s communiqués and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 








reports from correspondents in Korea. These loosely linked, problematic channels constituted the 
Truman administration‘s information system during the Korean War.
74
 
     The popular view of communism as a spreading disease contributed to ―the almost universal 
applause that greeted Truman‘s decision to intervene in Korea.‖
75
 Opinion polls reflected 
overwhelming public support, and the White House claimed that only two major newspapers 
dissented. A Washington Post editorial said that ―these are days calling for steady nerves, for a 
strict eye on the ball, and for a renewed resolve to keep our purposes pure in the grapple we have 
undertaken with men who would plunge the world into darkness. The occasion has found the 
man in Harry Truman.‖
76
 Truman biographer David McCullough lists over a dozen influential 
Americans who publicly supported the decision to intervene in Korea. Voicing their support, the 
House of Representatives approved extending the draft by a vote of 315 to 4, and influential 
Senate Republican William Knowland publicly urged support for the President. Journalist Joseph 
Harsch said, ―never before … have I felt such a sense of relief and unity pass through the city,‖ 
in twenty years of working in Washington.
77
  
     This support, however, quickly evaporated for two reasons. First, the decision to limit the 
fighting in Korea bred dissent; second, news of the 24th‘s rapid disintegration disillusioned the 
public and legitimated criticism of the limited commitment. MacArthur‘s policy of press self-
censorship and the uncoordinated information system within the White House and the Army 
opened the door to realistic wartime reporting that fed political criticism and public dissent.
78
 
                                                             
74 Ibid., 6-9. 
 
75 Ibid., 35. 
 
76 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 781. 
 
77
 Ibid., 781-82. 
 





     Given the performance of the 24th Division during the first weeks of the war, news was 
understandably bad. War correspondent Marguerite Higgins claimed there was already a 
pervading sense of panic when she arrived in Seoul at the end of June. Constant retreat over the 
next three weeks did nothing to change that, and reporters accurately described what they saw. 
Some senior officers in MacArthur‘s headquarters believed reporters were not adequately 
censoring their dispatches, but Higgins says, ―We felt it our responsibility to report the disasters 
as we saw them. And we knew how passionately the guys who were doing the fighting wanted 
the ‗folks back home‘ to know what they were up against.‖
79
 The source of this conflict lay in 
differing points of view. MacArthur viewed events from the strategic level, which, under the 
circumstances, necessitated a series of costly delaying actions, while reporters at the front 
witnessed the human cost of lifeless paper plans.
80
  
     Historian Andrew J. Huebner argues that ―within the looser bounds of government censorship 
journalists laid bare the gloom of this early period.‖
81
 Higgins reported that comments like ―Just 
give me a jeep and I know which direction I‘ll go in. This mamma‘s boy ain‘t cut out to be no 
hero,‖ were common among the men.
82
 Lieutenant Edward James barely contained his fury when 
he challenged Higgins: ―Are you correspondents telling the people back home the truth? Are you 
telling them that out of one platoon of twenty men, we have three left? Are you telling them that 
we have nothing to fight with, and that it is an utterly useless war?‖
83
 These statements sharply 
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contrasted those of senior officers. Correspondent Denis Warner reported that prior to the 
disaster at Pyongtaek, General Barth stated, ―Those Commie bastards will turn and run when 
they find they‘re up against our boys.‖
84
 Barth was wrong. 
       Imagery from the Korean War reflected the changing tone of print news. Huebner argues 
that imagery of the American G. I. in Korea emphasized fatigue, sorrow, and stoicism, but 
acknowledges that this reflected a gradual process rather than a sudden change.
85
 Soldiers‘ poor 
physical condition, resulting from soft duty in Japan, exaggerated the tremendous physical 
exertion required to fight in the harsh terrain and weather of Korea. As a result, soldiers often 
looked exhausted, and photographs typically portrayed sleeping soldiers. A July Newsweek 
article reported that soldiers were ―dog tired,‖ and ―slogging‖ through retreat, while Life printed 
a photo captioned ―exhausted and unshaven American infantrymen [a]sleep on ration boxes and 
[a] rocky road-side.‖
86
 Newsreel footage usually included images of sleeping soldiers, 
reinforcing the exhaustion motif. This theme featured prominently in the first Hollywood movies 
set in Korea as well.  
     Images of Korean refugees brought the sorrowful reality of war home to the U. S. in a way 
not experienced in World War II, while many soldiers had the emotionally wrenching experience 
of leaving wounded men behind. These images and experiences led major media outlets to refer 
to Korea as ―Hell Country‖ or ―the Ugly War,‖ and radio broadcasts even ran uncensored and 
emotional comments from soldiers in the war zone.
87
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     Huebner asserts that the last characteristic of Korean War imagery is stoicism. He argues that 
journalists continued to portray American soldiers as heroic, but the heroic image differed from 
World War II. G. I.s fought on behalf of those on the home front in World War II, but they did 
not connect in the same way during the Korean War because of its limited scope. The Korean 
War image of the G. I. ―reflected the bleak odds facing American troops and reinforced the sense 
that they were somehow victims of circumstance.‖
88
 These images portrayed a stoic warrior who 
faced impossible odds for a limited cause that his own Commander in Chief labeled a police-
action. 
     The new image of the G. I. as a victim contributed to negative perceptions of the war in the 
public mind. Enthusiasm for the war increased after the successful U. S. landing at Inchon and 
subsequent invasion of North Korea, but the Chinese intervention in late November caused a 
sudden, drastic reversal of fortune. Beginning in January 1951, the White House and the Army 
made a concerted effort to improve their relationship with the press, which they hoped would 
alter the tone of reporting. That effort included publicizing the Medal of Honor. Truman had 
already displayed his willingness to influence opinion with the MOH when he used the 
opportunity of the successful Inchon invasion to announce its award to General Dean.  
 
General Dean Awarded the Medal of Honor 
     American lines firmed up around Pusan during the first two weeks of August, 1950. The 
remainder of the Eighth Army moved into the South Korean port and its commander, General 
Walton Walker, coordinated the fight. Increased numbers of soldiers from both the U. S. and    
U. N. stabilized the lines. In addition, the NKPA overextended its supply lines. The combination 
                                                             






of these factors stalled the North Korean advance. This small victory bolstered American 
confidence, but MacArthur‘s masterstroke at Inchon turned the tide of the war.  
     MacArthur conceived the idea for the Inchon landing in the first days of the war. On July 23, 
he described his plan to launch an ―amphibious landing of a two division corps in rear of enemy 
lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from 
south by Eighth Army‖ to the JCS.
89
 The Joint Chiefs were uncertain about the operation, but 
MacArthur prevailed upon them largely because of his reputation and overpowering personality. 
The landing was one of the most successful operations in the history of warfare and a moment of 
vindication for the Marine Corps, which had nearly ceased to exist in the interwar years. The 
operation broke the NKPA. Syngman Rhee restored his government in Seoul with an emotional 
ceremony on September 29, and with emotions running high from the rejuvenating effects of 
victory Truman announced that Major General William F. Dean was the first American to 
receive the Medal of Honor in the Korean War. 
     President Truman, like the vast majority of Americans, was awed by the MOH. It 
simultaneously rewarded individual heroism, celebrated patriotism, and altered memory. In 1945 
Truman said of awarding the MOH to Jake Lindsay, ―it was a privilege on my part to put this 
medal around his neck and I would rather have that medal than to be President of the U. S.‖
90
 
Truman respected the award, but he also understood that its emotional appeal could be used for 
specific ends. In a draft speech he used the MOH to vilify Congressional Republicans for 
politicizing legislation during the 1946 mid-term elections. Truman wrote in part: 
     It has been my privilege as President to bestow the Congressional Medal of Honor upon more 
     than a hundred men who have won it. 
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          I placed it around the neck of General Wainwright in the Rose Garden of the White House. 
     The General shed tears and told me that he expected to come home a disgraced man because 
     he‘d had to surrender to a vastly superior force on Bataan. I was happy to assure him that the 
     American people considered him a man, a leader and a hero. 
          I placed the medal around the neck of a good looking young man in a wheeled chair – with 
     both legs torn off in action. I myself felt like shedding tears when I fastened the medal. I told 
     him that the country was grateful to him for his sacrifice. He replied, ―Mr. President, my life 
     is my country‘s and my country may still have it.‖ 
          I placed this same greatest of medals – one I‘d rather earn than be President – around the 
     neck of a young sailor – a conscientious objector – who had served in the naval hospital corps 
     and who had carried a number of men who were previously wounded to safety under fire and 
     was one of the bravest of men – and he was honest. He told me that he loved his country and 
     would serve it anywhere – but he would not kill a fellow man. 
          Why do I tell you these things? Because you have forgotten them. You have forgotten the 
     ideals for which we fought under Franklin Roosevelt. Your vision is dimmed by greed, by 
     selfishness, by a thirst for power. You would sacrifice the greatest government that was ever 
     conceived in the mind of man for a mess of pottage – for a piece of beef, for a slice of 




Truman never delivered this speech, but it demonstrates his belief in the power of the MOH to 
affect the public. Truman undoubtedly had this in mind when he announced Dean‘s award on 
September 30, 1950. 
 On that day the Associated Press (AP) reported from Washington that Truman ―paid tribute to 
Gen. Dean‘s heroic leadership, courageous and loyal devotion to his men, and his complete 
disregard for personal safety.‖
92
 Truman, in a separate statement, said that he had ―profound 
respect and admiration for Dean and the other American fighting men who endured the early, 
heartbreaking retreats that turned at last into victory.‖
93
 Truman‘s language in this statement is 
important. The President recast the early heartbreaking days of the war as just one step in a long 
process that ultimately led to victory. Truman intended his statement to counteract negative 
reports that had left such a bad taste in the public‘s mouth. 
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     The AP quoted other portions of the official award citation emphasizing phrases like 
―Conspicuous Gallantry‖ and ―Inspiring Acts,‖ and provided lengthy quotes that elucidated 
Dean‘s positive actions during the Taejon battle. The article‘s construction demonstrates the 
purposeful use of language to influence memory as it connects Dean‘s past actions to the 
eventual outcome at Inchon. Truman said, ―These acts, so inspiring to those of us here on the 
home front, were of almost incalculable value on the battlefield. They substantially contributed 
to the surge of heroism and devotion which swept thru the ranks of the embattled infantry men of 
those early days in Korea and enabled them to make their magnificent stand against the 
overwhelming forces opposing them.‖
94
 As a two-war President, Truman understood better than 
anyone else that Americans flushed with victory would all too easily accept this new memory of 
the past. Dean‘s case thus serves as a preeminent example of how the MOH connected the 



















The Modern American Military Award System 
     George Washington created the first medal for American soldiers during the Revolutionary 
War. The Badge of Military Merit was striking because it broke with the European tradition of 
bestowing awards only upon officers, but it was awarded sparsely and fell into disuse 
immediately after the Revolution. The American military did not maintain any award until 1847, 
when the Army established the Certificate of Merit for acts of heroism against an enemy. The 
Army discontinued the Certificate of Merit after the Mexican-American War but reinstated it in 
1874.  
     The Medal of Honor, created in 1861, was the first permanent award in the American 
military. At that time, the MOH held little meaning because it was widely distributed. The 
process of sanctifying the MOH began at the turn of the 20th century. The Army converted the 
Certificate of Merit to the Distinguished Service Cross in 1918, and with the addition of the 
Silver Star and the Distinguished Service Medal in 1919, established the American Pyramid of 
Honor. The awards pyramid expanded during World War II to cover a greater number of 
soldiers, including pilots and service soldiers among others. Since that time, the essential 
structure established in World War I, and expanded in World War II to recognize both heroism 
and service, has remained intact. The MOH achieved its hallowed status over time through the 
creation of lower awards and the implementation of a bureaucratic structure to maintain the 
paucity of its award. The most important factor, however, was the high percentage of 
posthumous MOHs in World War II.  
    





     Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells recommended creation of the MOH as a way to promote 
efficiency within the Navy, and soon after the Army created its own MOH. Both branches 
identified acts of gallantry, or displays of soldier-like qualities, as the main criteria for the award. 
This vague language resulted in a wide range of nominative interpretation. With no bureaucratic 
experience handling awards, the Army and Navy awarded the MOH for a variety of acts.
95
 
      The first award of the MOH involved a group of twenty-one Union soldiers, and a spy named 
James J. Andrews, that left Shelbyville, Tennessee in April 1862 to capture a Confederate 
locomotive near Atlanta. They planned to sabotage lines of communication on their way north to 
Chattanooga to prevent Confederate reinforcements from arriving when the Union launched an 
impending attack. The mission failed, and the Confederates captured all twenty-two men. The 
Confederates executed eight of the men, while another eight escaped. The remaining six were 
prisoners of war until March 1863. Upon their release the prisoners were ordered to debrief the 
Judge Advocate General in Washington, D. C. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton received the 
men, praised their bravery, and informed them that they were to be the first recipients of a new 
medal authorized by Congress. Nineteen-year-old Jacob Parrott, a member of the raiding party, 
became the first man awarded the MOH.
96
 
     At the end of the Civil War, 1,520 Medals of Honor had been awarded, not all of them for 
acts of gallantry. Edwin Stanton authorized the commander of the 27th Maine to award the MOH 
to any of his men who extended their commitment beyond their scheduled discharge. All of the 
unit‘s men, regardless of whether or not they stayed, received the MOH due to a clerical error.
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Controversy erupted over awarding the MOH to civilian doctor Mary Walker who claimed to be 
a spy for the Union Army, but Judge Advocate Joseph Holt ―concluded that because of her 
patriotism, her exposure to peril, and her hardship during imprisonment, she constituted an 
almost isolated [case] in the history of the rebellion; and to signalize and perpetuate it as such 
would seem to be desirable.‖
98
 The honor guard at President Lincoln‘s funeral also received the 
MOH. 
     A group of MOH awardees formed the Medal of Honor Legion in 1890 and asked the Army 
and Navy to strike all previous awards from the record that did not involve enemy contact. Major 
General John Schofield responded with an order that, for the first time, officially recognized the 
difference between heroism and service in the award criteria. The order stated that ―Medals of 
Honor should be awarded to officers or enlisted men for distinguished bravery in action, while 
Certificates of Merit should, under the law, be awarded for distinguished service, whether in 
action or otherwise, of a valuable character to the United States. . . .‖
99
 This distinction was 
groundbreaking, but significantly, the order stated that the Certificate of Merit be awarded only 
for actions that brought distinction to the United States. In contrast, the MOH was to be awarded 




     In 1897, the War Department strengthened the criteria for the MOH in an executive order that 
stated: 
     In order that the Congressional Medal of Honor may be deserved, service must have been 
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     performed in action of such a conspicuous character as to clearly distinguish the man for 
     gallantry and intrepidity above his comrades – service that involves extreme jeopardy of life 
     or the performance of extraordinarily hazardous duty. Recommendations for the decoration 
     will be judged by this standard of extraordinary merit, and incontestable proof of performance 




The order established stringent requirements for the MOH, meaning that few would qualify for 
the award. This heightened reverence for the award, but raised its criteria to the extent that many 
heroic acts would go unrecognized. 
     President Theodore Roosevelt enhanced the MOH‘s prestige in 1905, when he ordered formal 
presentation ceremonies to be hosted by the Commander in Chief and held at the White House. 
Roosevelt added a bit of theatricality to MOH presentations, but the President understood the 
psychological impact receiving the award from the Commander in Chief held. Although this 




     In 1916, Congress passed a comprehensive national defense act to prepare the United States 
to enter World War I. One of the Act‘s provisions established a review board to ―ascertain what 
medals of honor, if any, have been awarded or issued for any cause other than distinguished 
conduct by an officer or enlisted man in action involving actual conflict with an enemy.‖
103
 Any 
awards identified were to be stricken from the record. This was the first effort to strengthen the 
meaning of the MOH by restricting the number of awardees.
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     Nelson Miles served as president of the review board. He felt uncomfortable with his task, in 
part, because he had written two MOH recommendations for civilian scouts during the Indian 
Wars sure to be rescinded by the parameters imposed on the board. Miles proposed that Congress 
recognize previous awards and implement new criteria for future decorations, but his request fell 
on deaf ears. The board identified 911 of 2,625 awards that did not meet the new requirements, 
and the War Department struck all of them from the rolls.
105
 
     The introduction of lower awards was the most concrete administrative action taken to 
enhance the prestige of the MOH. Between 1918 and 1919, Congress created the Distinguished 
Service Cross and the Silver Star to recognize valor, and the Distinguished Service Medal to 
recognize extraordinary service not involving combat. These new awards allowed acts of 
gallantry to be recognized at a lower standard than that of the MOH, reducing the temptation to 
exaggerate battlefield endeavors. As such, their creation elevated the MOH by virtue of its 
comparison to lesser awards.
106
 
     This was the beginning of the modern military awards system. This expansion was due, in 
part, to the creation of a modern national military in World War I. As historian Jennifer Keene 
argues, ―President Woodrow Wilson‘s decision in 1917 to form a national conscripted army 
touched the lives of practically all Americans,‖ and it was obvious to the War Department and 
the White House that few of the 3.9 million men serving in the armed forces would qualify for 
the MOH.
107
 This undoubtedly contributed to the decision to expand the awards system. The War 
Department viewed awards as a method of increasing ―aggressiveness on the battlefield,‖ but 
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Keene identifies an important aspect of award psychology by noting a negative effect on soldiers 
who did not earn an award. During World War I, support soldiers criticized the Army for not 
having any achievable awards for them. The Army and Navy did not act on these complaints, 
likely because the war was over before the issue mattered, but also because no one yet 
recognized the negative aspect of awards.
108
  
     During World War II, the military added five new awards for service, valor, or meritorious 
achievement in order to expand award eligibility and acknowledge the contributions of a wider 
group of service members.
109
 The military buildup before and during World War II also 
encompassed a bureaucratic expansion, which included, for the first time, Army and Navy 
internal decoration boards. The boards operated at the division level and above, and passed each 
case to its higher commander with a recommendation for approval or disapproval. This process 
repeated itself at each level of command until the award reached its final adjudicating 
authority.
110
 Despite the expansion of bureaucracy and the awards system, however, the military 
still had little experience with processing awards. In World War II the Army grew by 8.1 million 
people, and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson admitted that ―many a soldier whose conduct 
merits recognition does not get formal recognition by way of a decoration.‖
111
 This was the first 
American war to witness widespread grumbling about awards. Many veterans claimed men 
received awards who did not earn them, while men who deserved awards did not receive them. 
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The complaints also reflected how veterans had internalized award symbolism by the end of 
World War II. 
     The War Department delegated authority to award lesser decorations and service medals to 
field commands in order to spread the administrative load and make response time quicker, but it 
retained authority over the MOH. The War Department Decorations Board considered each 
MOH packet when it reached them, and submitted the packet to the service Chief of Staff and 
Secretary of War with its recommendation on approval. Some cases, however, never reached the 
War Department because subordinate commands did not always understand the process.
112
 
     The addition of lower awards created confusion because of the difficulty in determining what 
level of heroism a particular act demonstrated. Army Regulation 600-45 described the formal 
criteria for MOH consideration as performing an act of ―gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of 
his life‖ that if not done ―would not justly subject [the individual] to censure as for shortcoming 
or failure in the performance of his duty.‖
113
 The criteria for the Silver Star and Distinguished 
Service Cross also called for ―heroism,‖ while both the MOH and the Silver Star required 
―gallantry.‖ Whether one committed an act of heroism that was ―above and beyond the call of 
duty,‖ or simply ―extraordinary,‖ determined his respective eligibility for the MOH or the 
Distinguished Service Cross. The War Department considered the problem, but opted for 
ambiguity rather than an overly proscriptive system that likely would have reduced the number 
of awards issued during the war.
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     The attempts to limit the number of MOH‘s awarded worked. At the end of World War II 
only 433 of over 13 million servicemen received the award.
115
 The most significant fact 
regarding those recipients is that 243, or 56 percent, were posthumous awards, a fact that 
shrouded the MOH in death and sacrifice.
116
 The reverence given the MOH also heightened the 
respect shown to living recipients, since survival of the ordeal that earned them the award stood 
in stark contrast to the silent majority. Because World War II touched virtually everyone in the 
U. S., the MOH became a medium through which civilians could participate in military glory. By 
1950, the MOH symbolized individual heroism, national sacrifice, and broad American values. 
     Military psychologists recognize awards as part of the larger system of control and authority 
wielded by officers over enlisted soldiers. Within that system, awards provide a positive 
inducement for behavior, as opposed to punishment and discipline. While militaries often issue 
awards to recognize heroism or other desired types of behavior to inspire similar acts, awards 
more frequently have a negative effect. Psychologist Anthony Kellett quotes a British soldier in 
World War I as saying, ―I have known good men eat their hearts through want of recognition. 
How petty this sounds. Yet a ribbon is the only prize in war for the ordinary soldier. It is the 
outward visible proof to bring home to his people that he had done his job well. And, say what 
you may, a man‘s prowess will be assessed by the number of his ribbons.‖
117
 Receiving an award 
does not matter so much as not receiving an award. This does much to explain the persistent 
granting of campaign ribbons to every soldier just for participating, no matter how 
inconsequential they are to the success of the campaign. 
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     The importance of medals increases over time as they become the only tangible reminders a 
veteran has of his or her exploits. Official citations contextually frame memory for veterans, and 
bridge the inevitable chasm between themselves and civilians. This common experience among 
veterans leads them to show concern for fellow servicemen not receiving awards. Korean War 
veteran Darrell Heiliger expressed a commonly held belief when he said, ―I heard that often 
some men who deserved them were passed by, and others who didn‘t were decorated.‖
118
 Harold 
Putnam echoed Heiliger when asked if he thought the award system was fair, in the process 
illuminating a common flashpoint in the ubiquitous tension between officers and enlisted 
soldiers: ―Promised awards not given. Too many acts of heroism under awarded at enlisted level, 
over awarded to officers, especially career officers.‖
119
 The Eighth Army awarded over 210, 000 
medals during the Korean War, and that number would have been much higher had it included 
the Combat Infantry Badge, campaign ribbons, and service awards.
120
 The meaning attached to 
these symbols was so important to Korean War veteran Willie J. Eaglin that he fought ten times 
longer than the war lasted to get his medals. On June 28, 1984, he received word from the Army 
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Return to Gloom 
     The public mood improved following the Inchon landing but was short lived. The White 
House, the Joint Chiefs, and MacArthur sold the early disasters as a necessary hardship on the 
path to victory so well that it blinded them to the threat of Chinese intervention. Truman 
achieved his primary goals of pushing the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel and 
reestablishing South Korea‘s government in Seoul. Flushed with success, the administration 
became overconfident and updated its policy goals to include the pursuit and complete 
destruction of the NKPA. Battlefield success led to arrogance in Far East Command, and 
MacArthur‘s sycophantic intelligence officer made his reports conform to MacArthur‘s 
pronouncement that the Chinese would not intervene. Signs of Chinese intervention were there 
for anyone who wanted to see them. China had already stated that it would view the U. S. 
crossing the 38th parallel as an act of aggression, but U. S. officials focused on the Russian 
threat, viewing the Chinese as just another puppet regime. As American forces approached the 
Yalu River, the dividing line between China and Korea, the Chinese sprung their trap. 
Unprepared for winter and shocked at their sudden turn of fortune, American units found 
themselves in the longest retreat in American history. Press coverage returned to reality, and 
public approval of Truman and the war sank. Truman‘s Congressional foes hammered the 
administration, not for crossing the 38th parallel, but for not expanding the war to the Chinese 
mainland. When the Eighth Army finally recovered, the White House and the Army again turned 
to the MOH as a way to alter memory and influence public opinion. To combat low morale, the 






To the Yalu 
     The U. S. and U. N. restored South Korea to its pre-invasion borders by the end of September 
1950, a success for which Democrats in Washington happily took credit. Looking to the mid-
term elections in November, Democrats feared that the enthusiasm of victory would fade. They 
wanted to prolong that enthusiasm in order to maintain their hold on Congress, and with the 
NKPA broken, crossing the 38th parallel seemed like an easy way to do it. Unfortunately for the 
thousands of soldiers and Korean civilians who would die over the next two years, MacArthur 
was only too happy to comply. 
     There were other, less nefarious motivations behind this decision. A unified and democratic 
Korea would provide an ally for the U. S. and bolster the legitimacy of the U. N. as the total loss 
of North Korea to the communist world would have made a punishing statement to the 
international community on the consequences of cross-border aggression. In September, the 
administration embarked upon a campaign to sell the invasion of North Korea to the American 
public and its international allies.
122
 
     The JCS instructed MacArthur to proceed with crossing the 38th parallel as long as the 
Soviets and Chinese did not intervene. Truman stressed this point in NSC-81/1, which formally 
announced support for crossing the 38th parallel. He remained adamant, however, that the U. S. 
must avoid creating a general Asiatic war. The JCS message to MacArthur stated: 
     Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this 
     objective, you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and 
     airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the 
     time of such operations there has been no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to 
     counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your 
     forces cross the Manchurian or U. S. S. R. borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no 
     non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union 
     or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or 
                                                             






     south of the 38th Parallel will not include air or naval action against Manchuria or against 




Overconfident, MacArthur was blind to the Chinese threat as the U. S. and U. N. invasion of 
North Korea drew the Chinese into a new phase of the war. 
      MacArthur divided his forces into the Eighth Army and the X Corps. He ordered the Eighth 
Army to attack north from Seoul, towards Pyongyang and west of the Taebaek Mountain Range, 
and X Corps to conduct an amphibious assault on the eastern shore of North Korea. X Corps 
consisted of the 1st Marine Division and the Army‘s 7th Infantry Division. Both the Eighth 
Army and X Corps operated as autonomous commands, reporting directly to MacArthur‘s 
headquarters in Tokyo. The operation did not go as planned. X Corps was stuck at sea much 
longer than anticipated, while the Eighth Army encountered little resistance. The lack of 
resistance in the Eighth Army‘s sphere of operations encouraged confidence and created a 
widespread rumor that American forces would be home by Christmas.
124
 
     A ROK Army battalion reached the Yalu River on October 25, later that day interrogating 
prisoners who admitted to being Chinese. Over the next four days, Chinese Communist Forces 
defeated the ROK Army near Chosan, Onjong, and Huichon, yet the Eighth Army and Far East 
Command reported that it did not believe there was ―substantial Chinese participation‖ in the 
fighting.
125
 The engagements were limited and reconnaissance flights showed no movement 
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across the Yalu River, but the Chinese had infiltrated 180,000 soldiers into North Korea by 
moving at night and maintaining strict noise and light discipline.
126
 
     Even after four weeks of escalating fighting, the U. S. command remained unaware of the 
magnitude of Chinese intervention. Finally, on November 28, MacArthur sent a message to the 
JCS expressing his belief ―that a crisis existed in Korea.‖
127
 He claimed the CCF had gained 
strategic initiative by stopping the Eighth Army‘s drive in the west and successfully executing a 
surprise attack on X Corps in the east. MacArthur called it ―an entirely new war,‖ and ordered 
the Eighth Army and X Corps to withdraw from their northern positions towards Pyongyang 
after a conference with General Walker and General Ned Almond, X Corps commander.
128
 
Unfortunately, it was too late, as the Chinese had already drawn the Americans into a trap. 
     The Eighth Army began retreating on November 28, while on its right flank, the U. S. 2nd 
Division started its withdrawal one day later. The CCF launched its first full-scale offensive 
against the Americans as they withdrew. The 2nd Division suffered over 3,000 casualties on 
November 29, but X Corps suffered even more when the CCF ambushed its Marines and the    
U. S. Army 7th Regiment near the Chosin Reservoir. As word of the attacks spread through the 
ranks, a sense of panic overwhelmed many of the men. An orderly retreat once again turned into 
disastrous panic. In contrast, under the inspired leadership of Major General Oliver P. Smith, and 
with some help from the 7th Regiment, the Marines stood firm and fought their way out of a 
terrible situation with their pride and cohesion intact.
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     December 1950 witnessed the disastrous retreat of American forces and a return to the 
gloomy mood of July and August. Winter‘s onset compounded the situation as temperatures 
dropped below zero. In addition to the earlier themes of fatigue, sorrow, and stoicism, 
correspondence from Korea during this period emphasized the harsh winter cold and 
mountainous terrain. The CCF‘s enormous size, often described by American servicemen as 
hordes, also dominated descriptions of the fighting. Captain Norman Allen expressed this view 
in a December letter to his mother: 
     Boy, have things become a damn mess!! Everyone is running. There are only a few effectives 
     left. The divisions have lost much equipment in these night withdrawals and especially the 
     ambushes. . . . It seems to me a crime to give up Korea after all it has cost us. But there is no 
     holding the place if the Chinese want it. Even with complete air superiority, they can‘t be 
     stopped. The Chinks are in droves and herds. Jesus, but I never saw so many. Squeeze off a 




Others remembered the temperature being near zero, lack of food and sleep, and the pitiful state 
of refugees. September‘s enthusiasm gave way to poor morale as the Chinese pushed U. S. and 
ROK Army forces back across the 38th parallel. 
     Expanding the war to the Chinese mainland became a divisive issue within the U. S., and 
news reports from Korea, like Homar Bigart‘s description of the 2nd Division‘s fight as 
―slaughter‖ and ―ghastly,‖ fed growing public pessimism. The Pentagon sent Army Chief of 
Staff Joe Collins to Korea to get the truth about what was happening. Unsurprisingly, he reported 
that no disaster was in the making. The administration spent the next two weeks trying to quell 
debate and build support for maintaining limited objectives, but this was complicated by the 
reality that the Eighth Army was in full retreat.
 131 
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     MacArthur‘s headquarters blamed reporters for the growing pessimism surrounding the war, 
and insisted that reporters had blown events out of proportion by misrepresenting limited tactical 
engagements as strategic setbacks. Much as they had the previous July and August, reporters 
fought back, arguing information from MacArthur‘s headquarters lacked credibility. 
Correspondents wrote of low morale, freezing temperatures, and ragged soldiers retreating in the 
face of overwhelming forces, while some openly questioned the logic behind the positioning of 
U. S. units.
132
 By mid-January, negative reports, partisan bickering, and haunting images of 
broken soldiers combined to create a negative image of the war. The White House and the Army 
launched a public relations effort, including publicizing the MOH, to improve their relationship 
with the press in hopes that it would result in more positive reports.  
      
Publicizing the Medal of Honor 
     The first MOH presentation ceremony of the Korean War took place on January 9, 1951. The 
timing was due, in part, to the administrative process required for MOH nominations, but the 
drastic turn of events witnessed in December and January also played a role. On January 4, 
General Matthew Ridgway, elevated to command of the Eighth Army, ordered his forces to 
abandon Seoul because he did not think his men could hold the line. The CCF nearly destroyed 
X Corps and pushed American units south of the 38th parallel. The Eighth Army established a 
defensive line near Osan, approximately forty miles south of Seoul, where Ridgway hoped to 
rebuild his men‘s confidence.
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     Against this backdrop the White House and the Army targeted both the home front and the 
soldiers fighting in Korea with MOH publicity. On the home front the MOH connected 
individuals to the war through heroic descriptions and public ceremonies. The presentation 
ceremony was carefully planned, starting with a press release announcing its date and time. A 
Washington Post article on January 1, 1951, announced that the wives of General Dean and First 
Lieutenant Frederick Henry would receive the MOH in lieu of their husbands, and also reminded 
readers of the previous October when Truman had first announced Dean‘s award.
134
 The Army 
released a description of Henry‘s actions, as told by a member of his platoon, on January 4. The 
story emphasized the enemy‘s overwhelming numerical superiority and Henry‘s self-sacrifice for 
his fellow soldiers.
135
 The Army released General Dean‘s story, as recounted by one of his aides, 
the next day. The article stated that ―Big Bill Dean … was last seen helping stragglers and 
wounded near Taejon after he single-handedly attacked an enemy tank armed only with a hand 
grenade.‖
136
 The story both embellished Dean‘s individual actions and oversimplified the context 
of the event to make it appear more audacious and gripping. Like Henry‘s story, Dean‘s 
emphasized his front line heroics for the sake of others and the size of the enemy. With Dean, the 
Army subtly crafted a positive memory of the public‘s one fighting hero of the Korean War into 
the crisis in confidence of January 1951. No one expected MOH publicity to create an 
immediate, sweeping change of opinion over the war, but Truman and Army officials understood 
the emotional effect of the award‘s symbolism and used it for maximum effect. 
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     Ceremony plans included detailed timelines and task assignments, including invitations and 
arrangements for press coverage. Media coverage was a high priority. The schedule of events for 
each ceremony always included time for the President to have photographs taken with the 
recipient and/or family members. These photos, reproduced in newspapers across the country, 
created a positive visual image of the Commander in Chief or a senior member of the American 
high command, with a heroic soldier or his family. The public ceremonies acknowledged the 
recipient‘s sacrifice and heroism, which held great meaning for all involved, but they also altered 
memory by honoring individual exploits out of their broader operational context. The somber 
nature of the public ceremony encouraged audiences to accept this altered memory, imbibed with 
anachronistic meaning, to create a positive image. The White House and the Army hoped that 
this positive image would counteract the negative conception of the war created by reports and 
images from the frontlines.
137
 
     Truman used Korea‘s first MOH award ceremony to remind the public of General Dean‘s 
heroism and connected his individual actions to the eventual success at Inchon. This was an 
intentionally positive message meant to restore the public‘s hope for victory in the war. A skilled 
politician, Truman seized on a bit of good news from the battlefield to publicize the next batch of 
MOH awards. After Ridgway established a new battle line near Osan, he launched progressively 
larger operations that restored his men‘s confidence. He also benefitted from the CCF reaching 
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     The Eighth Army launched small offensive actions across its line in January and early 
February. Ridgway focused his efforts on reconnaissance to gather information on the CCF, 
believing that if the Eighth Army could hold the line and wear the enemy down enough, an 
opportunity for a major counterattack would present itself. Ridgway launched Operations Killer 
and Ripper in late February and early March, resulting in the recapture Seoul and restoring the 
battle line at roughly the 38th parallel.
139
 During this time the Army noted that all of its MOH 
awards had been presented posthumously, or were earned by prisoners of war. The Army wanted 
a living MOH recipient to publicize on the home front.  
     Defense Secretary George C. Marshall expressed his concern over the lack of living MOH 
recipients in a letter to Joe Collins. Marshall thought that ―in the normal course of events 
someone should perform a feat worthy of the Congressional Medal of Honor and live to tell 
about it.‖
140
 He did not order Collins to find a living recipient, but Collins understood the 
message. Collins was already aware of the situation, evidenced by a report from March 1951 
listing eleven posthumous awards and three to prisoners of war.
141
 He likely forwarded the report 
to Marshall while notifying MacArthur of the situation. Collins suggested that MacArthur pull 
nominees for the MOH off the frontlines so the Army could bring a living recipient back to 
Washington ―for appropriate high level ceremonies.‖
142
 A living recipient offered the chance to 
present a smiling G. I. describing his own exploits to the public, but it also showed soldiers that 
heroic acts did necessarily cost them their lives. 
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     On the home front, MOH publicity counterbalanced negative press coverage by putting a 
positive face on the war and by allowing civilians to connect with the battlefield through heroic 
acts. The Army publicized the MOH within its ranks to alter memory and to psychologically 
inspire emulation. This was particularly important in light of soldiers‘ poor performance during 
the early weeks of the war and after Chinese intervention. This effort coincided with Ridgway‘s 
assumption of command and rapid improvement of the Eighth Army‘s effectiveness. Army Chief 
of Information Major General F. L. Parks recognized the potential to influence soldier behavior 
by connecting the Commander in Chief‘s words to the powerful symbolism of the MOH. He 
released a memorandum to the service secretaries in January that included a quote from President 
Truman at a MOH ceremony. Truman commended ground troops‘ sacrifice in the cause of 
freedom, and Parks directed that ―it will be given the widest publicity we can attain, especially in 
service journals.‖
143
 Reproducing quotes from the Commander in Chief in internal print media 
was just one way of reinforcing the type of behavior the Army wanted to see in its soldiers. 
      Distributing official citations represented a second method for reinforcing positive behavior. 
Lieutenant General Edward H. Brooks, in charge of the Army‘s personnel system, directed 
subordinate units to publish official citations in a ―distinctive format,‖ and to post them in 
conspicuous areas like unit bulletin boards. The instructions also included an order to Troop 
Information and Education Officers to distribute ―copies of the quotations from the President‘s 
speech‖ as widely as possible through all media types.
144
 The Department of the Army 
reproduced the citations as General Orders on a single sheet bordered with large stars. On the 
back of the orders a directive from General Collins stated, ―This general order will be read to all 
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troops and will be posted conspicuously on the bulletin boards in each unit area."
145
 Distributing 
information in this war represented the most efficient way of ensuring that soldiers heard the 
type of behavior the Army expected of them. 
      Recommenders submitted nominations for the MOH on War Department Form 639, 
Recommendation for Award – Heroism (WD639), which included space for narrative 
descriptions of the mission, enemy situation, and the acts of the nominated individual. Sworn 
statements accompanied this form along with map sketches and a proposed citation.
146
 
Decoration and Award Boards often returned the packets for clarifications or additional 
evidence. No one wanted to award the MOH to someone who did not deserve it, and nothing in 
the records suggests any undue political influence was applied in any particular case. 
Recommenders constructed a proposed citation from the sworn statements, but they were usually 




     The event descriptions contained in the official citations intentionally contrasted with the 
individualistic attitude that prevailed during the July and November-December retreats. Master 
Sergeant Melvin O. Handrich‘s citation stated that his company was almost annihilated by the 
enemy. Handrich ―voluntarily left‖ a relatively safe place to direct artillery fire ―with complete 
disregard for his own safety‖ while exposing himself to heavy enemy fire. According to the 
citation, Handrich refused to leave his position to protect the withdrawal of his men. The 
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citation‘s final sentence states that ―M[aster]/Sgt. Handrich‘s sustained personal bravery, 
consummate courage, and gallant self-sacrifice reflect untold glory upon himself and the heroic 
traditions of the military service.‖
148
 This specific description of Handrich‘s actions contrasts 
distinctly with battlefield reports in newspapers and magazines, while the last sentence features 
hyperbolic language meant to inspire men in the ranks.  
     Handrich‘s case also offers a good example of the Army‘s attempts to influence opinion by 
altering memory of the past. The Eighth Army recommended Handrich‘s nomination be 
downgrade to a Distinguished Service Cross, but the Department of the Army approved it for the 
MOH.
149
 To the Eighth Army, the similar language of the DSC achieved the same purpose of 
reinforcing behavior as did the MOH. The Army had a broader view however, and awarded 
Handrich the MOH both to recognize his heroism and alter memory of the previous August.  
     The case of Captain Lewis Millett provides another excellent example of the Army‘s use of 
the MOH to influence behavior. Millett commanded a company of the 27th Regiment during 
February 1951. His nomination packet undoubtedly benefitted from the inclusion of a letter from 
S. L. A. Marshall, who conducted after-action reviews with the company on February 12.
150
 
Millett‘s men noted his courage in leading multiple bayonet assaults into enemy lines. This was 
exactly the type of behavior Ridgway was looking for in his officers. In his endorsement of the 
MOH nomination, Ridgway suggested to the IX Corps commander that the after-action report 
would ―make good reading for every infantryman.‖
151
 Major General Bryant E. Moore promptly 
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instructed his subordinate units that ―this paper be read to every infantry company of the IX 
Corps at the first opportunity. At the same time, leaders will take the opportunity of explaining to 
their men how effective charges are with marching fire and the bayonet against the present 
enemy.‖
152
 To maximize the impact of this nomination, Commanders bypassed the average four 
month approval period by immediately reading the after-action review to their soldiers, 
understanding that the nomination would be discussed with the after-action report. Senior 
commanders hoped that MOH nominations would impact behavior as much as the award itself. 
As an added bonus, Millett was a living recipient. 
     The award of the MOH to Private First Class William Thompson provides another key 
example of this type of inspirational usage. Thompson was a member of the all-black 24th 
Regiment that earned a terrible reputation during the early weeks of the war due to racial bias 
and the Regiment‘s poor battlefield performance. The 24th Regiment performed no worse than 
many white units, but rampant distrust within the organization exacerbated an already bad 
situation. Integration began in August 1950 because there were not enough white replacements. 
When Truman ordered integration in 1949, the Army dragged its feet, but the war catalyzed 
rapid change. By October most observers, and an Eighth Army investigation, recommended 
immediate, full integration of units, but Walker deemed it administratively impossible to 
deactivate an entire regiment at that time. Nevertheless, the Army recognized the need for 
measures to bolster black soldiers‘ confidence, and viewed the MOH as a way to inspire them.
153
 
     Thompson‘s commander nominated him posthumously for the MOH in January 1951 for 
actions taken in August 1950. The packet proceeded through various command levels without 
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incident, earning high praise from senior officials. The Army approved Thompson for the MOH 
on April 30, 1951.
154
 The citation emphasized his lone stand against a larger enemy force 
allowed ―his platoon to withdraw to a more tenable position,‖ even while he was ―hit repeatedly 
by grenade fragments and small-arms fire.‖
155
 This citation, like those for white soldiers, 
emphasized these heroic individual acts contrasted with general reports of disorder from the 
early weeks of the war. This packet also signaled a great social step forward for the U. S. Army, 
awarding a black soldier the nation‘s highest award for valor less than one year into the war after 
the MOH was denied to black soldiers in World War II. 
     The White House paid close attention to the status of MOH nominations, requiring the Army 
Adjutant General‘s Office to send regular updates. This process reached peak efficiency in early 
1952 after the front lines had settled, leaving units with more time to devote to administrative 
tasks.
156
 The stalemated war slowly faded from the press, and the White House had less need of a 
counterweight to bad news. The use of the MOH to influence opinion and inspire soldiers was 
most important in early 1951, but for the duration of the war publicity surrounding the award 
continued to alter memory and emphasize desired behavior. 
     The White House and the Army countered negative reports and imagery with a steady stream 
of positive statements, heroic citations, and photographs depicting smiling families at MOH 
ceremonies. The design of the ceremony made connecting these small, often isolated, events to a 
larger war narrative believable. The Army publicized the MOH within its ranks to inspire acts of 
heroism after the generally poor performance of its soldiers in July and November-December. At 
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the end of April 1951 the public dispute between General MacArthur and President Truman 
came to a head, and, by summer, the war settled into a stalemate. MacArthur‘s recall, battlefield 
stalemate, and the rise of McCarthyism gave a new purpose to MOH publicity.          
          

























     General MacArthur was a celebrated hero in the U. S., and his recall from Tokyo for 
subverting White House policy in Korea caused a tremendous, albeit temporary, stir over what 
the U. S. hoped to achieve in the war. MacArthur and his supporters argued that the U. S. could 
achieve total victory if Truman would permit bombing the Chinese mainland. Truman and his 
advocates maintained that a limited commitment both contained communist aggression and 
prevented World War III. As the war settled into a stalemate, the Korean War looked like a 
mistake to many Americans. After mid-1951 American, Korean, and Chinese troops fought over 
hills and mountain ranges to win leverage at the negotiation table. The end of maneuver warfare 
in Korea signaled the end of widespread public interest in the war. The Korean War was already 
being forgotten just one year after it started, even as Cold War rhetoric heated up. Republicans 
had long accused the Truman administration of being soft on communism, but the twin issues of 
communist propaganda and the brainwashing of POWs intensified during the last two years of 
the war. The MOH continued to acknowledge incredible acts of bravery on the battlefield, but 
for the remainder of the war its publicity emphasized social inclusion and toughness on 
communism. 
 
MacArthur Sacked  
     In March 1951, the State Department drafted a resolution offering a cease-fire to the Chinese. 
The JCS solicited MacArthur‘s opinion on the offer, but he urged ―that no further military 
restrictions be imposed upon the United Nations Command in Korea.‖
157
 MacArthur promptly 
                                                             





released his own statement insisting China had ―been shown its complete inability to accomplish 
by force of arms the conquest of Korea,‖ and offered ―to confer in the field with the commander 
in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the 
realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may 
justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.‖
158
 MacArthur 
established national policy with this statement, completely subverting civilian control of the 
military. Truman, however, was not yet ready to fire him.       
     Republican Joe Martin read a private letter from MacArthur to Congress on April 5, 1951 that 
argued there was ―no substitute for victory.‖
159
 The letter directly opposed Truman‘s policy of 
negotiating with the Chinese and led to MacArthur‘s recall. The JCS charged MacArthur with 
inability to carry out his orders, failing to clear public policy statements through the President, 
and subverting civilian control of the military. The JCS presented their recommendation to 
Truman, who announced he would relieve MacArthur.
160
 
     Truman believed his limited strategy made sense within the context of the larger Cold War. 
With that in mind, official statements focused on the need for vigilance to defense against the 
communist threat on the one hand, and the need to avoid atomic war on the other.
161
 Even so, 
evidence suggested that no matter how the White House justified MacArthur‘s dismissal, there 
would be a public backlash. Richard Whelan points out that ―the President was burned in effigy 
in many towns across the country, and many flags were lowered to half-mast.‖ A wide majority 
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     General MacArthur‘s three day testimony opened a joint Senate Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services Committee hearing that lasted from May 3 to June 25. Despite the initial backlash 
against Truman, the hearings provided an opportunity for the country to debate its course in both 
the Korean and Cold Wars. MacArthur‘s desire to widen the war to achieve total victory lost out. 
The State and Defense Departments uniformly supported limited commitment to Korea, arguing 
that total war would reduce diplomatic and military flexibility in the broader Cold War.
163
 With 
the question of the level of commitment decided, MOH publicity began to emphasize general 
communism as a threat.  
 
Red Hordes 
     An article in the Chicago Daily Tribune of January 8, 1951, headlined, ―Yank Bashes in 
Skulls of Reds with a Shovel‖ is an early example of this trend. The opening paragraph of the 
article bluntly describes the scenario: ―A soldier who fired all his ammunition, threw all his 
grenades, and then bashed in the skulls of Korean Reds with a shovel has been awarded the 
congressional medal of honor.‖ This graphically violent description laid bare the feelings an 
American should have for the ―Reds,‖ and suggested that they deserved the brutal punishment 
Brown inflicted with his shovel. The term ―Red‖ or ―horde‖ was common in news reports, and 
implied that the communists had no individuality, which reinforced images of unthinking masses 
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controlled by Moscow. Individual Americans were heroes by virtue of standing against the ―Red 
hordes.‖ 
     The Army was particularly interested in the number of communists involved in any combat 
action. Commanders typically estimated enemy numbers at a three to one ratio or greater. Sworn 
statements in MOH recommendation packets commonly used the term ―horde‖ to describe the 
CCF. A United Press article noted that Lieutenant Samuel S. Coursen jumped into an enemy 
machine gun pit to save a soldier and ―killed seven Reds before he was shot in the back.‖
164
 
Though the article celebrated bravery and self-sacrifice, it emphasized that one American killed 
seven Communists.       
     Another article commended Sergeant Travis E. Watkins for fighting ―vastly superior forces‖ 
and killing six ―Red soldiers.‖
165
 According to the article, Watkins, paralyzed from a wound, 
directed a battle that killed 500 enemies. The story left out the operational context of his actions, 
instead focusing on his individual achievements. This created a mental image of Watkins 
engaged in hand-to-hand fighting against the ―Red hordes‖ for the reader—an image that was, of 
course, the point. Americans on the home front could fight communism vicariously through 
heroic winners of the MOH, or they could identify with the war negatively through images and 
stories of tired, sorrowful, and stoic soldiers. The White House and the Army obviously 
preferred the former. 
 
Communist Propaganda  
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     U. S. government officials feared that its soldiers and civilians could be swayed by 
communist propaganda, particularly those from marginalized sections of society. Historian Aviel 
Roshwald argues that ―the showcasing of the USSR as a harmonious, voluntary community of 
autonomous nations‖ was a prominent feature of Soviet propaganda as far back as the early 
1920‘s.
166
 This message originally targeted people of color subjugated by European colonials. 
The growth of communism between 1920 and 1950 indicated that the message was working. The 
Korean War brought Americans into contact with the communist message of racial harmony and 
forced the U. S. to offer inclusion to non-white Americans.  
     Samuel Fuller‘s 1951 motion picture, The Steel Helmet, brought racial issues to a mass 
audience. The movie featured a platoon with an African-American medic, a second generation 
Japanese-American--or Nisei--soldier, and a gruff, disillusioned white sergeant. In one scene, a 
captured North Korean Major confronts the black medic, arguing that communism offered 
equality to blacks. The Major argues that the medic is fighting for a country in which he must 
ride at the back of a bus and eat in separate diners. The medic replies that those things are true, 
but lectures the Major on the progress of blacks in the U. S. since slavery. Equality will come, he 
says, but ―some things just take time.‖
167
 
     In another scene, the Major quizzes the Nisei, asking if his parents were sent to a camp during 
World War II. The sergeant, Tanaka, replies that they had. The Major accuses the Nisei of being 
―idiots‖ for fighting for the U. S. In a reply that demonstrates the powerful symbolism medals 
embodied, Tanaka replies, ―over three thousand of us idiots got the Purple Heart!‖
168
 These 
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dialogues targeted white audiences, but raising racial issues in this public forum was an 
important step.  
     The White House and the Army used the MOH to change white Americans‘ attitudes towards 
non-whites by including people of color in the national pantheon of heroes. One example of this 
racial aspect in MOH publicity is the announcement of awards granted to Lieutenant Thomas 
Hudner and Corporal Mitchell Red Cloud. Hudner, a white Navy pilot, won the MOH for trying 
to save the life of Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the Navy‘s first black pilot. Even though Brown was 
not awarded the MOH, a Washington Post article featured pictures of all three men, one white, 
one black, and one American-Indian side-by-side with the subheading ―Three American heroes 
of the fighting in Korea.‖
169
 The CCF shot Brown‘s aircraft down as he provided air support to 
Marines during the Chosin battle. Hudner landed his aircraft to rescue Brown, but he was unable 
to do so. The publicity surrounding this MOH celebrated Hudner‘s heroism, but also highlighted 
the racial aspect of the story; a white officer risked his life to save a black officer. By packaging 
these three together in a news release, the Army intended to reinforce racial cohesion within the 
military, but also hoped to foster a change in attitudes at home. To reinforce this message, 
Truman personally presented the MOH to Hudner. 
     Red Cloud‘s story was also conspicuous compared to other MOH awards. The Department of 
Defense reported that Red Cloud was with his unit near Chonghyon, North Korea in November 
1950 when the enemy attacked his unit. Although wounded, Red Cloud continued to fire his 
weapon until killed by the enemy. There are fewer details in this account compared with other 
reports, and the terms ―Reds,‖ ―hordes,‖ or ―overwhelming numbers‖ do not appear. Newspapers 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 






generally reprinted portions of the official citation that emphasized individual heroism, self-
sacrifice, and the impossible odds, but Red Cloud‘s story drew attention to his race.
170
 
     Prisoners of war and brainwashing became prominent issues as the war settled into stalemate. 
Conditions for U. S. POWs were deplorable. Captured Army physicians reported after 
repatriation ―that the lack of medicine and health facilities resulted in the needless deaths of 
countless prisoners.‖
171
 The harsh winter of 1950-51 resulted in frostbite for many of the 
prisoners, but they nevertheless marched with broken legs or other wounds. In the camps 
prisoners faced contaminated water, interrogation, and mysterious inoculations where one needle 
was used for as many as twenty men. Captain Gene N. Lam, a captured surgeon, remembered 
undergoing brainwashing, a process where the Chinese attempted to convert POWs to 
communism, for ten months, a technique that the Army considered very dangerous.
172
 
     An estimated 7,000 Americans were POWs during the Korean War, but unlike in other 
conflicts, few managed to escape. Early studies determined that nearly thirty percent of prisoners 
collaborated with the communists, causing greater alarm than the almost thirty percent who died 
in the camps. Twenty-one Americans chose to stay in North Korea rather than be repatriated, a 
very low proportion of the overall number of prisoners, but one that still caused tremendous 
alarm. During the last two years of the war many Americans feared brainwashed POWs could 
infiltrate the U. S. to carry out communist subterfuge.
173
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     Major William Mayer, an army psychiatrist in Korea, conducted a study of brainwashing 
techniques. In the first step, the communists destroyed group cohesion by removing leaders to 
special camps if they did not give in. Once the communists achieved distrust within the group, 
indoctrination began. Their captors explained to the prisoners that ―Imperialist Wall Street 
Warmongers‖ were responsible for the war. Communist instructors used articles from the 
American press to reinforce the idea that the prisoners fought wars for others to get rich.
174
 Roy 
Hardage remembered that inside the building where instruction took place, ―on the walls were 
slogans like ‗Down with the Warmongers‘ or ‗You Are Cannon Fodder.‘ I had never heard such 
terms as ‗Money Bags,‘ ‗Cannon Fodder,‘ or ‗Imperialists‘ before in my life.‖
175
 The 
communists believed that once a soldier lost faith in America and, by extension, in the reason for 
his deployment to Korea, he was prepared to accept communism. 
     The communists segregated POWs by race, hoping to make inroads with marginalized 
segments of U. S. society. Robert Fletcher, a member of the all-black 24th Regiment, described 
his experience at the Chinese Camp Five in early 1951: 
     Every morning an instructor would start roll call. Lin or one of the other English-speaking 
 instructors would give us a little lecture for about a half hour or forty-five minutes. Then we‘d  
break up into groups of ten or so for what they called study groups where we were supposed 
to discuss what we had just heard. The instructors would compare Communism to capitalism, 
starting back in the Stone Age with Lenin and Engles versus the Rockefellers and DuPonts. 
They would talk about when wars started none of the rich go but always the poor people. In 
the discussion groups we were supposed to discuss all this. The Chinese called me a 
reactionary because I‘d say, ―Let‘s look at the Second World War. I can talk about that 
because I was a young man. In Russia, which is a Communist country, who fought the fucking 
wars there? There was supposed to be no poor and no rich. But everybody was poor.‖ . . . 
They didn‘t play the race card so much during the interrogations as in the educational 
sessions. They would remind me that I had said, ―You know white people will never let black 
people accomplish anything in the United States.‖ So they‘d tell me, ―They‘re always going to 
control the money, control the jobs, make sure their friends will always have a job, and black 
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people will just get so far. What you need to do is go back to your country and help start a 
revolution. Get the money out of their hands. Get the controls away from the warmongers.‖ 




As Lewis H. Carlson astutely points out, few POWs took this kind of brainwashing seriously and 
did only what they had to do so to survive. Unfortunately, however ―the American public, caught 
in the throes of Cold War and McCarthy paranoia, the massive Chinese effort to indoctrinate and 
‗brainwash‘ their captives became the indelible legacy of the Korean War POWs.‖
177
  
      From the study of communist brainwashing techniques and their perceived success, 
psychologists concluded that American soldiers were defective ―in character development and 
self-discipline; in general education, particularly about the operation of a democracy and the 
multicultural role of the world; and in military preparedness.‖
178
 This analysis was overly 
critical, but the POW situation in Korea was unlike anything the Americans had previously 
experienced. The communist threat seemed greater because its philosophy could penetrate 
anywhere. ―Red‖ fears on the home front compounded the problem, and perceptions of what 
American soldiers should act like in captivity were unfairly based on the World War II image of 
the G. I. The shift away from an idyllic hero to a stoic victim negatively affected Americans‘ 
image of POWs.  
      In June 1951 the front line was north of the 38th parallel. Ridgway replaced MacArthur in 
Tokyo as commander of United States Army Far East Command, and General James Van Fleet 
succeeded Ridgway as Eighth Army commander. Van Fleet was an offensively-minded officer, 
like Ridgway, and he maintained the momentum that the Eighth Army had gained from 
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Ridgway‘s leadership. Measured offensive operations pushed the Chinese further north, but the 
Army and the White House feared the manpower available to the Chinese could turn the tide 
again. Both sides finally started negotiations at Kaesong with low level representatives, a fact 
that changed the character of the Korean War. There would be no more dramatic maneuvers like 
MacArthur‘s Inchon landing. The decrease in the war‘s drama was paralleled by a decrease in 




The Final Two Years 
     Truman continued to present the MOH to recipients during the spring and summer months of 
1951. As the war faded from public view, MOH press releases grew shorter and less vitriolic 
towards the ―Reds.‖ A number of announcements consisted of a few short paragraphs that only 
reprinted the portion of the citation commending the individual for bravery above and beyond the 
call of duty, a line found in all citations. These articles were focused on announcing the award 
rather than attempting to alter memory. A Washington Post article announcing Sergeant George 
Libby‘s award stated that he ―deliberately laid down his own life in order to help wounded 
comrades escape from a Communist trap.‖
180
 Libby earned the MOH for actions undertaken 
during the battle of Taejon, the same battle in which General Dean earned the award, but this 
article starkly contrasted with the publicity that Dean received in October 1950 and January 
1951.  
     Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr. earned the MOH posthumously on June 17, 1951. The 
press release announcing the award represented more of an obituary than an inspirational story of 
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bravery and heroism. The article provided Faith‘s biographical information and brief quotes from 
his citation with the usual references to bravery and gallantry. There was no elaboration of his 
specific actions or the number of enemy killed, and no mention of menacing ―Reds.‖
181
 In the 
early months of 1951, MOH publicity assumed an active tone that vicariously connected the 
reader with battlefield heroes. During the spring of that year, when the Eighth Army was again 
on the offensive, MOH publicity took on a vitriolic tone against the mindless ―Red hordes‖ to 
emphasize the communist threat. After the war stalled and public attention decreased, the tone of 
MOH publicity grew much quieter. The publicity simply recognized that American heroes were 
still fighting in Korea, and emphasized broader American values.  
     There was, of course, some overlap in these themes. Captain Raymond Harvey survived the 
exploits that earned him the MOH, and a June article pointed out that he launched several one-
man attacks, killed ten ―Reds,‖ and continued on even though wounded.
182
 Interestingly, despite 
being a living recipient, the article does not quote Harvey at all. This may have been due to 
MOH recipient Master Sergeant Ernest R. Kouma, who, in May, announced to the press that 
soldiers were ―disgusted‖ over the Korean War because there seemed to be no end in sight.
183
 
Clearly, no one coached Kouma on how to handle the press and, therefore, he answered honestly. 
Harvey may have answered questions too, but, as an officer, he was unlikely to say anything as 
controversial as had Kouma. The Army recognized the need to put MOH winners in the public 
eye, but it was apparent that after Kouma, recipients received coaching on what to say. 
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      In a June 1951 article, columnist John Crosby wrote that soldiers were cropping up 
everywhere on television. He said, ―The serviceman is all over the place – winning things, telling 
the true story for the first time anywhere on how he won the Medal of Honor, or just appearing 
gracefully and modestly on screen while the emcee tells him and us how grateful the Nation is to 
him.‖ Crosby also noted, however, that there was evidence that these soldiers were being 
exploited.
184
 He described a scene on a program called ―We, the People,‖ where one of three 
MOH winners replied to a question about his experiences in Korea with what Crosby called, 
―lines that had obviously been written for him,‖ while the other two merely echoed the first‘s 
answer.
185
 Crosby argued that the answers were too neat, and that the public deserved to hear 
what the fighting men actually had to say. Throughout the remainder of the war MOH recipients 
remained conspicuously quiet. 
     MOH publicity during the stalemate increasingly emphasized the heroism of recipients as 
being symbolic of wider American values. Truman, during a July MOH presentation ceremony, 
said that the recipients were ―the backbone of our Government,‖ and that because of them the   
U. S. would ―win the Cold War.‖
186
 A picture of Truman with the four awardees standing behind 
him, proudly displaying the MOH in dress uniforms, reinforced the image of military heroes as 
the ―backbone‖ of the government. The article contained an overview of each recipient‘s 
exploits, and included a picture of one of the smiling men kneeling to be kissed by his three-
year-old son. Another image expressing this idea juxtaposed Korean War MOH recipients with 
American communists arrested in Los Angeles. The image showed the eleven living recipients 
                                                             










from the Korean War, all but one expressionless and stoic, below the title ―Heroes and . . .‖ The 
bottom picture depicts ten smiling, laughing communists, convicted of trying to overthrow the U. 
S. government, being released from jail on bond, titled ―. . . Enemies of the Republic.‖ The 
implicit argument contained in the images was that heroes fought for American interests, even 
overseas, while communists subverted the government at home.
187
  
     Between 1952 and 1953, MOH publicity continued to promote American ideals, such as 
individual bravery and heroism, against the general communist threat, particularly by 
highlighting awards to non-white soldiers. One article announced, ―Hawaiian Soldier Killed in 
Korea Awarded Honor.‖ Herbert K. Pililaau earned the MOH for his ―one-man stand to cover 
the withdrawal of his buddies,‖ and ―was credited with killing 40 Communist troops.‖
 188
 These 
pronouncements showed continuity with earlier themes, but the article‘s reference to Pililaau‘s 
race was telling.  
     African-Americans bought into the idea that the MOH could influence racial attitudes in the 
U. S. as much as the Army and the White House did. Van Charlton, whose son received the 
MOH posthumously said, ―My son did not give his life in vain for his bravery has now been 
recognized by the President of the United States and the whole country. And even those persons 
in America who have felt that the Negroes are second class citizens must in their hearts now 
know that that isn‘t so. My son has proved that the Negro is worthy of the country‘s highest 
honor.‖
189
 Charlton‘s statement demonstrated the success of publicizing African-American MOH 
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winners. Black activists also promoted awarding the MOH to blacks to prevent their falling prey 
to communist propaganda.  
     Edgar G. Brown, then president of the National Negro Council, publicly urged President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower to award the MOH to Courtney L. Stanley, who reportedly held off 
fifteen communists during a battle in 1953. Brown argued that awarding the MOH to the white 
officer involved in the same incident, and to Stanley, an African-American, ―would be a most 
effective propaganda weapon in the psychological warfare to win Asiatic and African 
understanding and friendship for the ways of democracy.‖
190
 Eisenhower, however, preferred to 
rely on the existing bureaucratic structure for awarding the MOH since neither man received the 
award. 
     After assuming the Presidency, Eisenhower sought a way to extricate the U. S. from the 
Korean War, but continued Truman‘s policy of limited commitment. The issue of POW 
repatriation had derailed armistice talks since the summer of 1951. After two additional years of 
fighting, broken truce talks, and strained relations between allies, the belligerent parties signed a 
cease-fire. The morning of July 27, 1953, witnessed no celebrations. The U. S., representing the 
U. N., and the Chinese signed an armistice and departed Panmunjom without saying a word to 
each other.
191
 Fifty-seven years later, 28,500 American troops remain in South Korea.
192
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     The White House and the Army used the Medal of Honor and its publicity to alter American 
memory of the disastrous early weeks of the war, inspire and reinforce desired behavior in 
soldiers, and counter communist propaganda. We must question, however, how well that effort 
worked. It is difficult to measure that answer empirically because the extent to which the MOH 
motivated actions varied between individuals. Additionally, individuals are often unaware of 
how symbols affect their behavior. Nevertheless, this study offers at least limited conclusions.  
     Using MOH publicity to alter the memory of past events appears to have achieved mixed 
results. MOH citations reprinted in newspapers influenced individual perceptions of past events 
because the articles distilled complex battlefield events into the story of one man. This 
contextual scaling made the battlefield easier to understand for those on the home front and 
certainly altered their image of particular battles. General Dean‘s case is the best example of this. 
His citation plucked a few heroic acts out of an overall disaster, and Truman teleologically linked 
the failed defense of Taejon to the outcome at Inchon. No one, however, questioned this. Even 
Dean‘s critics focused on his battlefield actions rather than Truman‘s interpretation of them.  
     It does not, however, seem that these individual alterations of memory led to a collective 
change. While American‘s happily accepted that Dean‘s actions contributed to success at Inchon, 
their negative perceptions of July and August, created by realistic battlefield imagery and 
reports, remained unchanged. Many Americans were content to believe both that the early 
months were a disaster, and that Dean was a hero. In a sense, the MOH added a footnote to the 









     The Army‘s ability to inspire soldiers with MOH publicity is also difficult to measure. 
Psychologists and historians have uncovered myriad reasons why soldiers fight, but medals are 
not among them. Despite that fact the military continues to believe, at least publicly, that 
rewarding a soldier with a medal in front of his peers somehow inspires the peers to emulate the 
behavior described in the citation. Listening to their commander read a MOH citation probably 
influenced some soldiers in the short term, but it is highly unlikely that the MOH directly 
inspired them on the battlefield. The fact that MOH winners rarely mention their own awards, 
much less anyone else‘s, demonstrates that fact. Awards acknowledge an individual‘s past 
actions more than they inspire emulation, but evidence suggests that the MOH reinforces the 
latent role structure in the Army for enlisted soldiers and officers. In their study of the MOH and 
military role structures during Vietnam, sociologists Joseph A. Blake and Suellen Butler argue 
that officers earned the MOH for war-winning actions, while enlisted men earned it for 
lifesaving actions.
194
 This appears to be true for enlisted men in the Korean War as well, but 
officers received the award for both lifesaving and war-winning. Rather than inspire actions, the 
MOH seems to have reinforced different types of behavior appropriate for different ranks. 
     The award system‘s most immediate effect seems to be its negative effect on those who did 
not earn an award. This appears to be a shared experience, in that those who received medals still 
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fought for those who did not. Veterans often relate stories of soldiers they knew who deserved an 
award, but did not receive it. The bureaucracy of the awards system is mostly to blame for this, 
and illuminates the ever-present tension between officers and enlisted soldiers. Typical of 
enlisted soldiers is Woodrow Birckhead‘s expression of disdain for the awards system: ―Fair? 
Not at all. In [sic] April 23, 1951, 6 silver stars were awarded. 1, to a Corporal, and 5 to officers 
who where [sic] not on the line. Is that fair or anothe[r] representation of how much rear 
leadership is required[?]"
195
 Donald H. Summers described his experience with the award 
system: "[I] did not receive any medals, until 38 years after discharged and only because of VFW 
inquiry." Summers demonstrates both bureaucracy at its worst, and the importance veterans 
attach to medals.
196
 Officers, on the other hand, typically described the process as fair. Despite 
the differences of opinion, all parties seem to agree that medals have an intrinsic value that 
grows with the passage of time.  
     The success of MOH publicity countering communist propaganda is also difficult to measure. 
Recognized as a national symbol of courage and bravery, the MOH easily contrasted images of 
communists but there were relatively few communists in the U. S. to begin with. As such, this 
type of publicity seems to have reinforced a preexisting anti-communist trend. The MOH rarely 
made front-page news, illuminating its relative importance with other contemporary issues. The 
values symbolized by the MOH, and those reciprocally defined as communist, confirmed for 
many white Americans what they already knew. 
     Non-white Americans, particularly African-Americans, benefitted the most from the MOH 
during the Korean War. Blacks could say that their blood was of equal value to that of whites. 
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Newspaper articles, movies, and images showed multi-racial units succeeding together. MOH 
articles describing non-whites usually emphasized the recipient‘s race first, and then followed 
the familiar pattern of quoting from their official citation. The Army kept MOH citations fairly 
standardized, and the press articles often used the same words and phrases, like ―gallantry‖ and 
―bravery above and beyond the call of duty,‖ to describe soldiers‘ actions. This made non-white 
Americans heroes of the same magnitude as whites, which undoubtedly had some affect in the 
changing racial attitudes in the American public. 
     In broad terms, publicizing the MOH for specific purposes during the Korean War probably 
did not achieve the goals the White House and Army desired. There was no immediate 
connection between the awarding of the MOH and changes in public opinion, nor were soldiers 
particularly inspired by the exploits described in MOH citations. The sanctity of the MOH 
morally protected it from overt politicization, while the long bureaucratic procedure required for 
MOH nomination had the same practical effect. Nevertheless, the Truman administration and the 
Army used the MOH to the extent that they could. Further research would help to confirm or 
deny the conclusions of this study. Comparing MOH publicity in World War II, the Korean War, 
and the Vietnam War would be particularly useful in light of the general public perceptions of 
each war, both at the time and currently. A comparative analysis with other countries and their 
military award systems would also illuminate the universal nature of bravery symbols. The 
importance of the issues raised in this paper is not, however, limited to the distant past. During a 
2006 hearing before the House of Representatives Military Personnel Subcommittee, committee 
members and veterans expressed their concern over the lack of Medals of Honor awarded since 





awarded posthumously. Since the hearing, seven Medals of Honor have been awarded, the most 
recent to a living recipient – Staff Sergeant Salvatore Giunta.  
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